



ABSTR AC T. For more than two decades, the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) and the
Federal Circuit have exercised nearly complete institutional control over the patent system. Yet in
recent years their stewardship has been widely criticized, largely on the basis of two particular
failings. First, the PTO grants significant numbers of invalid patents, patents that impose
substantial costs on innovative firms. And second, over time the Federal Circuit has steadily
loosened the rules governing patentability, allowing ever more patents over a greater range of
inventions. This Article argues that both of these modern trends may be attributable in whole or
in part to the asymmetric institutional relationship between the PTO and the Federal Circuit. If a
patent applicant is denied a patent by the PTO, she can appeal that denial to the Federal Circuit.
However, if the PTO grants the patent, no other party has the right to appeal. Accordingly, the
PTO can avoid appeals and reversals, both of which are costly in monetary and reputational
terms, simply by granting any patent that the Federal Circuit might plausibly allow. Because the
PTO will grant nearly any plausible patent, the vast majority of rejected applications that are
appealed to the Federal Circuit will concern boundary-pushing inventions that are unpatentable
under current law. Occasionally, a particularly patent-friendly panel of Federal Circuit judges
will elect to reverse the PTO and grant a patent that the Agency has denied. The Federal Circuit's
decision will create a new, inflationary precedent. The boundaries of patentability will expand
slightly, as this new precedent exerts influence on the other circuit judges. And as the Federal
Circuit's conception of what may be patented expands, the PTO will similarly inflate its own
standards in order to maintain an adequate margin for error and avoid denying a patent that the
Federal Circuit is likely to grant on appeal. Patent law will thus be subject to a natural
inflationary pressure.
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INTRODUCTION
The shape of patent law is defined in large degree by the interaction
between two institutions: the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). Intervention from Congress or the
Supreme Court comes rarely-Congress went nearly sixty years without
significantly altering substantive patent law,' and until very recently the
Supreme Court has generally been reluctant to weigh in on many of the most
important patent questions.' In their absence, the Federal Circuit and the PTO
have arrived at an institutional ditente. The Federal Circuit dictates the rules of
substantive patent law to the Patent Office via interpretations of the Patent
Act.' The PTO then grants or denies patents according to those rules.4
Yet this structural accord has not well served the patent system or the
private parties who rely on it. In recent years both the PTO and the Federal
Circuit have received trenchant criticism for their handling (and mishandling)
of patent applications and patent cases. Critics have leveled two particular
1. In 2011, Congress passed and the President signed the America Invents Act, Pub. L. No.
112-29, § io(a)(i), 125 Stat. 284, 316(2011) (to be codified in scattered sections of35 U.S.C.),
the first significant change to substantive patent law since 1952. In 1994, Congress altered
the patent term in order to comply with the Uruguay Agreements, but these changes did not
otherwise affect the substantive content of the law. See, e.g., Uruguay Round Agreements
Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 532(a), 1o8 Stat. 4809, 4983 (1994) (codified as amended at
35 U.S.C. 5 154(a)(2) (2006)).
2. The Supreme Court has expressed an "increased interest in patent cases" in recent years. See
Timothy B. Dyk, Foreword: Does the Supreme Court Still Matter?, 57 Am. U. L. REV. 763, 764
(20o8). However, for most of the two-decade period since the Federal Circuit was formed,
the Supreme Court has devoted "barely enough attention to exert any real influence on
patent jurisprudence." Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of an Institutional Identity: The
Federal Circuit Comes ofAge, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 806-07 (2008).
3. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (granting the Federal Circuit exclusive jurisdiction over appeals
from district courts and the PTO arising under the Patent Act); cf Act of July 19, 1952,
ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. 5§ 1-293) [hereinafter "the Patent
Act"].
4. See Koninklijke Philips Elec. N.V. v. Cardiac Sci. Operating Co., 590 F.3 d 1326, 1337 (Fed.
Cir. 2010) ("We remind the district court and the [Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences] that they must follow judicial precedent"); Megan E. Lyman, Judicial Fitness
for Review of Complex Biotechnology Issues in Patent Litigation: Technical Claim Interpretation,
23 J. NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 503, 509 (2003) ("The PTO is bound by the decisions
handed down by the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court."); Craig Allen Nard, Deference,
Defiance, and the Useful Arts, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1415, 1420-21 (1995) (explaining the legal




charges: first, that the PTO grants too many invalid patents;s and second, that
the Federal Circuit has steadily loosened the legal rules governing patentability,
allowing applicants to obtain patents on an ever wider variety of inventions.'
The first criticism is all the more remarkable in light of the second. Despite the
fact that the Federal Circuit has noticeably expanded the boundaries of what
may be patented over the past decades, the PTO continues to grant significant
numbers of patents that are invalid under governing Federal Circuit law.
Scholars have attributed the patent system's joint dysfunctions -an excess
of invalid patents and overly permissive rules of patentability -to a number of
potential causes. These include funding shortfalls at the PTO; internal
management problems at the PTO; a lack of expertise at the PTO or the
Federal Circuit; capture by private interests; and, perhaps most importantly, a
simple ideological preference for greater numbers of patents across a broader
range of technologies.' Nonetheless, there remains sharp disagreement
regarding the likely causes of these systemic problems and their proper
solutions. Indeed, a variety of correctives have been proposed and implemented,
to little avail."
This Article intends to offer a different explanation for the problems
plaguing the patent system. The permissive nature of the PTO and the
inflationary tendencies of the Federal Circuit might instead be due to the
contorted institutional relationship that exists between the two organizations.
5. See, e.g., ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 34-35 (2004);
Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in
Biomedical Research, 280 Sci. 698 (1998) (analyzing the negative effects of a crowded patent
field on innovation and market entrance); Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent
Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1495, 1495 n.i (2001); Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley,
Rethinking Patent Law's Presumption of Validity, 6o STAN. L. REV. 45, 47 n.5 (2007); Robert P.
Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business
Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 589-91 (1999); Michael J.
Meurer, Patent Examination Priorities, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 675, 676 (2009) (" [T]he PTO
struggles to improve examination quality."); Mark Lemley, Doug Lichtman & Bhaven
Sampat, What To Do About Bad Patents?, REG., Winter 2005-2006, at lo, 10-13 (noting that
"countless patents that seem reasonable to a lay audience overreach in technical fields" and
describing in particular the problems generated by economically significant invalid patents).
6. See, e.g., FTC, To PROMOTE INNOVATION 14 (2003), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2oo3/10/
innovationrpt.pdf; JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 5, at 115-19; Jay Dratler, Jr., Alice in
Wonderland Meets the U.S. Patent System, 38 AKRON L. REV. 299, 304 (2005). Here and
throughout the text, I use the word "patentability" to describe all of the doctrines governing
whether an invention is patentable. This includes whether the invention recites patentable
subject matter, 35 U.S.C. § lol, whether the invention is novel, 35 U.S.C. § 102, and whether
it is nonobvious, 35 U.S.C. § 103, among other requirements.
7. See infra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
8. See infra Part I.
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Because of the manner in which patent cases make their way from the PTO to
the Federal Circuit, the PTO has a decided institutional interest in granting
more patents than it should. And because of this same interaction, the Federal
Circuit is engaged in an unwitting expansion of the patentability rules.
The key lies with the asymmetric nature of appeals from the PTO to the
Federal Circuit. When the PTO denies a patent application, the aggrieved
applicant may appeal to the Federal Circuit.' When the PTO grants a patent,
however, there is no losing party to appeal -the victorious applicant merely
walks away with its patent."o That patent is unlikely ever to see the inside of a
courtroom, given how few infringement lawsuits are litigated." Like most
administrative agencies, the PTO wishes to avoid appeals and especially
reversals." In order for the Agency to accomplish this, it need only err on the
side of granting excessive numbers of patents - even invalid patents - for which
there is no appeal. This desire to avoid litigation is a source of the invalid
patents now being issued by the PTO in vast numbers - the patent system's
first problem.
The second problem, the ongoing expansion of the rules governing what
types of inventions may be patented, stems from the PTO's proclivity to grant
any plausible patent. Because of the PTO's efforts, the patent applications that
the Agency denies will predominantly concern inventions that are unpatentable
under current law.' When a disappointed patent applicant appeals such an
application to the Federal Circuit, that court has two options. It can reject the
patent under existing law, preserving the law as it stands, or it can grant the
patent under a new, more expansive understanding of what is patentable. The
circuit denies most of these applications.14 But when the Federal Circuit
9. 35 U.S.C. § 141.
io. While no Code provision affirmatively states that no party may appeal when a patent is
granted, this inference may be deduced from the fact that the only Code provision that
mentions or allows appeal only speaks of "applicant[s]" who are "dissatisfied" with the
decision of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI). See id.
11. In addition, those patents that are eventually litigated in the context of a suit for
infringement will likely have neutral effects on the patent law trends described here. I
discuss the issue of infringed patents in detail infra Subsection II.D.5.
12. See infra Subsection II.D.1.
13. Although the PTO could avoid appeals entirely simply by granting every patent, there are
countervailing forces that prevent it from doing so. See infra notes 110-122 and
accompanying text.
14. Since its creation in 1982, the Federal Circuit has reversed the PTO on direct appeal
approximately 15% of the time. This figure was calculated based on data taken from Donald
R. Dunner, J. Michael Jakes & Jeffrey D. Karceski, A Statistical Look at the Federal Circuit's




eventually decides a case in favor of an applicant, it creates a new precedent
that enlarges the scope of what may be patented. The process then repeats
itself, with the PTO denying more boundary-pushing patent applications and
the Federal Circuit being presented with further opportunities to expand the
limits of patentability. The result is a natural inflationary pressure on the law,
generated entirely by the types of cases that the PTO sends to the Federal
Circuit.
These effects rely on only three innocuous factors. First, the PTO - through
its administrators - pursues its own organizational interests. Second, the
Federal Circuit is composed of heterogeneous judges who do not always agree
on the proper content of patent law. This means that a patent applicant could
draw a favorable Federal Circuit panel and be granted a patent that the median
Federal Circuit judge would find invalid. And third, the PTO is asymmetric.
Only an applicant whose patent has been rejected may appeal a PTO decision
to the Federal Circuit. Using only these three institutional features of the
patent system, this Article builds a model of the interaction between the PTO,
Federal Circuit, and patent applicants, which predicts that improperly granted
patents will expand the legal boundaries of patentability."
This Article thus identifies a novel institutional source for the patent
system's problems. The goal is not to demonstrate that the other possible
causes of patent inflation- ideology, lack of expertise, and so forth-are
incorrect. It is possible that some of these causes are at work alongside the
institutional pressures described here. But it is crucial to note that even if all of
these other potential causes were eliminated, the systemic problems of bad patents
and expanding patent law would remain, driven by the institutional
relationship between the PTO and Federal Circuit. Accordingly, this Article
suggests a legal solution that would directly address these institutional issues at
their source.
Circuit "has affirmed the PTO's determination of unpatentability about 8o% of the time,"
and the Federal Circuit's own website, Statistics, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED.
CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/the-court/statistics.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2011),
which provides data for the years 1997-2010. Those data reveal that the Federal Circuit has
reversed PTO decisions approximately 11.8% of the time in the past fourteen years. Data for
1995 and 1996 are unavailable.
15. This Article is in the tradition of other works that have posited asymmetric development of
the law through selection effects and other mechanisms. See Marc Galanter, why the "Haves"
Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 95 (1974);
Gillian K. Hadfield, Bias in the Evolution of Legal Rules, 8o GEo. L.J. 583 (1992); Daniel
Klerman, Jurisdictional Competition and the Evolution of the Common Law, 74 U. CHI. L. REv.
1179 (2007).
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Finally, the interaction between the PTO and the Federal Circuit is
uncommon but by no means unique. Nearly every type of civil litigation or
administrative proceeding produces winning and losing parties, either of
whom can appeal to the federal courts. This is of course true for standard civil
trials, and it is true as well for essentially every federal administrative action,
from promulgating major regulations" to individual funding 7 or permitting
decisions. Yet asymmetric systems of review exist in several important areas
of federal benefits law (such as Social Security Disability benefits),' 9
immigration law,2 o tax law," and-most importantly-jury verdicts in criminal
law." Indeed, even systematically different rates of appeal by civil litigants -for
instance, perhaps tort defendants appeal adverse judgments more frequently
than tort plaintiffs - can give rise to meaningful (though more muted)
asymmetries in appellate review." It is worth noting, however, that most of
these other areas of law involve only the adjudication of private rights against
the government. A Social Security claimant (or a criminal defendant) acquires
no rights against other private actors. By contrast, the PTO and the Federal
Circuit are in the business of granting patents that may then be asserted
against third parties who were never involved in the proceedings. Patent law
thus offers applicants a nearly unique opportunity to capitalize on institutional
asymmetries to the detriment of outside actors.
16. E.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 837 (1984)
(challenging an EPA regulation creating a "bubble rule" for new sources of pollution).
17. E.g., Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419-20 (1971) (blocking
the Secretary of Transportation from releasing highway construction funds).
18. E.g., Carolina Envtl. Study Grp. v. United States, 51o F.2d 796, 797 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(challenging an Atomic Energy Commission order granting permission to construct two
new nuclear reactors).
19. See 42 U.S.C. § 405 (20o6) (procedural rules for Supplemental Security Income/Social
Security Disability Income claims). Other governmental benefits programs such as tax
adjudications also involve asymmetric appeal rights.
20. See 8 U.S.C. 5 1252(a)(1); 28 U.S.C. 5 2344; John W. Guendelsberger, Judicial Deference to
Agency Decisions in Removal Proceedings in Light of INS v. Ventura, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 6o5,
616 (2005).
21. See LEANDRA LEDERMAN & STEPHEN W. MAZZA, TAx CONTROVERSIES: PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE 8 ( 3d ed. 2009).
22. See Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 75 (1978) ("The short answer to this question is
that there is no exception permitting retrial once the defendant has been acquitted . . . .");
Kate Stith, The Risk of Legal Error in Criminal Cases: Some Consequences of the Asymmetry in
the Right To Appeal, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 26-27 (1990) (arguing that asymmetry in criminal
appeals will deceive judges as to the characteristics of a "typical" case).




This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I briefly describes the complaints
that scholars and stakeholders have registered against the Patent and
Trademark Office, the Federal Circuit, and the patents (and patent law) that
they have jointly produced. Part II explains and analyzes the interaction
between the PTO and the Federal Circuit, beginning with a simple model and
building toward a more nuanced description that incorporates the
characteristics and motivations of the individuals in charge of those
institutions. It also describes the roles of other actors within the patent system,
offers an important testable prediction, and proposes a remedy to patent law's
institutional maladies. Part III presents a case study of the relationship between
the PTO and the Federal Circuit concerning the evolving rules that undergird
the patentability of intangible processes, an evolution that culminated in the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Bilski v. Kappos.' Part III shows how the
forces described in Part II have effectively broadened the rules governing the
patenting of software, business methods, and related inventions.
1. PATENT PROBLEMS
There is by now a broad consensus that the United States patent system is
rife with flaws and inadequacies." The "patent crisis," as more than one
commentator has termed it," has become so severe that in many cases patents
are now believed to retard innovation more than they promote it." Critics of
the patent system have pointed to two particular problems. First, the PTO does
a poor job of examining patents, allowing significant numbers of invalid
patents to issue. Second, the Federal Circuit has pushed the law in an
24. 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
2s. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERs PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (20o8); DAN L. BURK & MARK A.
LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND How THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2009); JAFFE & LERNER,
supra note 5.
26. See, e.g., BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 25 (starting from the premise that a crisis exists within
the patent system); NAT'L AcAD. OF Sci., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2004)
(same); Peter S. Menell, The Property Rights Movement's Embrace ofIntellectual Property: True
Love or Doomed Relationship?, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 713, 737 (2007) (describing "a growing
patent crisis"); Beth Simone Noveck, "Peer to Patent": Collective Intelligence, Open Review,
and Patent Reform, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123, 123 (20o6) (describing a patent crisis in high-
technology fields).
27. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 25, at 124 (arguing that biotechnology is the only field in
which patents increase innovation).
as. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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excessively pro-patent direction, broadening the scope of patentable subject
matter and endowing patentees with unwarranted power. 9
Critics have ascribed these failures to a wide range of causes. Some have
pointed to the PTO's lack of funding, which forces the Agency to spend
relatively little time scrutinizing each patent.30 Others have argued that the
PTO is hamstrung by poor management." These management problems
include the fact that the PTO's salary and bonus system is structured in such a
way as to incentivize examiners to grant rather than deny patents." Some
scholars have placed blame on the fact that both the PTO and the Federal
Circuit appear to lack genuine expertise in the technologies involved in modern
patents." Others allege that the PTO and the Federal Circuit have been
29. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 5, at 130-33; Rochelle Dreyfuss, Pathological Patenting:
The PTO as Cause or Cure, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1559, 1567 (20o6) (reviewing JAFFE & LERNER,
supra note 5) ("Fee diversion has impoverished the PTO, making it difficult for the Office to
search or examine prior art comprehensively."); Lemley, supra note 5, at 15o8-11 (noting the
negative effects of funding shortages); Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 5, at 53 (noting the
short amount of time the PTO spends scrutinizing each patent); Arti K. Rai, Growing Pains
in the Administrative State: The Patent Office's Troubled Quest for Managerial Control,
157 U. PA. L. REV. 2051, 2o62-63 (2009).
31. E.g., JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 5, at 133-38; Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Ending
the Patenting Monopoly, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1541, 1554 (2009) (noting the well-known tensions
between patent examiners and PTO management); Rai, supra note 30, at 2063-64.
32. Examiners receive bonuses based on how many applications they can process fully. The
quickest and easiest way for them to finish processing an application is to grant the patent.
JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 5, at 136; cf John Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment,
75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 540-41 (2007) (noting that judges' preferences for leisure time
will incline them to grant more motions for summary judgment than would otherwise be
appropriate). One suggestive study found that patent approval rates spike in September-
the month in which the PTO's accounting year closes and examiners are awarded bonuses
for processed applications. Gajan Retnasaba, Why It Is Easier To Get a Patent in
September? (May 23, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract
id=112113 2.
33. See, e.g., ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY:
CASES AND MATERIALS 299-327 (4th ed. 2007) (describing the Federal Circuit's struggles
with the written description requirement); Dreyfuss, supra note 3o, at 1577 (noting that the
PTO does not have economists and other experts on staff); Mark D. Janis, On Courts
Herding Cats: Contending with the "Written Description" Requirement (and Other Unruly Patent
Disclosure Doctrines), 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 55, 62-69 (2000) (describing the Federal
Circuit's struggles with the written description requirement); R. Polk Wagner & Lee
Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial
Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105 (2004) (finding that the Federal Circuit has been only





captured by private, pro-patent interests." Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, some observers believe that the Federal Circuit simply holds an
ever-increasing ideological preference for greater numbers of patents over a
broader range of technologies."
Regardless of the exact cause, invalid patents and permissive, pro-patent
rules have imposed undeniable costs on inventors and consumers alike. Invalid,
improperly granted patents can dissuade potential competitors from entering a
market and stunt investment in further research. 6 They raise search costs for
firms that must scrutinize the intellectual property that exists in a given field
and investigate those patents' validity, lest a competitor later force them out of
the market.17 Invalid patents can also hamper a firm's ability to raise capital" or
34. See, e.g., BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 25, at lo6-07 (arguing that the PTO is subject to
capture); Dreyfuss, supra note 30, at 1567; Clarisa Long, The PTO and the Market for
Influence in Patent Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1965, 1967 (2009) (suggesting that the PTO has
invited capture in order to increase its own stature); Meurer, supra note 5, at 699
(suggesting the influence that repeat players can have on PTO behavior); John R. Thomas,
Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771, 792-94 (2003) (suggesting that the
Federal Circuit has been captured); R. Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent-Quality
Mechanisms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2135, 2153 (2009). But see John M. Golden, The Supreme Court
as "Prime Percolator": A Prescription for Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA
L. REV. 657, 685-86 (2009) (dismissing arguments that the Federal Circuit has been
captured).
35. E.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 25, at 69 (suggesting that the Federal Circuit has been
"pro-patent"); JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 5, at 115-19; WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 335 (2003) (arguing
that "[t]he Federal Circuit has indeed turned out to be a pro-patent court").
36. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 698; Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive
Effects of Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91 MINN. L. REV. 101, 113-27 (20o6); Suzanne
Schotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law,
5 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 29, 32 (1991) (noting that overbroad patent protection for the first
mover in a market "can lead to deficient incentives to develop second generation products").
37. See, e.g., MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 33, at 615-16 (describing the economics of search
costs); Ian Ayres & Gideon Parchomovsky, Tradable Patent Rights, 60 STAN. L. REV. 863,
869-76 (2007); Clarisa Long, Proprietary Rights and Why Initial Allocations Matter, 49 EMORY
L.J. 823, 828 (2000) ("The search costs of patent licensing should not be underestimated.");
Jonathan S. Masur, Patent Liability Rules as Search Rules, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 187 (2011)
(describing the impact of contributory liability rules on market entrance and search
responsibilities); Roger Cheng, ITC Says HTC Violating Two ofApple's Patents, CNET (July
15, 2011), http://news.cnet.conV8301-1035-3-20079905-94/itc-says-htc-violatingtwo-of-apples
-patents.
38. See FTC, supra note 6, ch. 2, at 8 ("The threat of being sued for infringement by an
incumbent [patent holder] -even on a meritless claim -may scare ... away venture capital
financing." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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write contracts with potential customers. 9 Financial markets will be wary of
firms that may not be sustainable because they traffic in infringing products.
Customers will hesitate before forming business relationships that may expose
them to suits for contributory infringement and will resist relying upon
suppliers who may be shut down or driven out of the market by a lawsuit.40
Invalid patents raise licensing and litigation costs.41 And once granted, they are
difficult to eliminate: granted patents are presumed valid and can only be
invalidated in court upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence.42
More broadly speaking, patents "involve[] a fundamental tradeoff between
dynamic and static efficiency: patents spur innovation but only at the cost" of
higher prices for current consumers." If too many patents are granted on too
many inventions, or if the courts allow patents to become too powerful, the
balance could tilt against patents as socially useful devices. If patents no longer
provided a significant incentive for innovation, they might not be worth the
costs that they impose upon consumers.4
In response to the inadequacies of the Patent Office and the Federal Circuit,
as well as the costs of bad patents, scholars have advanced a number of
proposals for reform. Some have argued that the PTO should receive
additional funding, enabling it to hire more and better examiners. 45 Others
39. Leslie, supra note 36, at 125-27.
40. See Joseph Borkin, The Patent Infringement Suit -Ordeal by Trial, 17 U. CHI. L. REV. 634, 641
(1950) ("Contributory infringement ... can serve as an effective side-attack to cut off the
economic support of a small producer.").
41. See Bresnick v. U.S. Vitamin Corp., 139 F.2d 239, 242 (2d Cit. 1943) (describing a patent as a
"scarecrow" that can deter competition by its very existence); Michael J. Meurer, Controlling
Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive Intellectual Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REv. 509, 515
(2003).
42. Spansion, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 629 F. 3d 1331, 1344 (Fed. Cit. 2010).
43. Ayres & Parchomovsky, supra note 37, at 867; see also DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES
OF PATENT LAw 6 (1998); MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 33, at 253-56 (describing the incentive
systems meant to drive patent law); Michael Abramowicz, The Uneasy Case for Patent Races
over Auctions, 6o STAN. L. REv. 803, 809-10 (2007) ("This trade-off between static and
dynamic efficiency is familiar to patent scholarship .... ); Joseph A. Franco, Note, Limiting
the Anticompetitive Prerogative of Patent Owners: Predatory Standards in Patent Licensing,
92 YALE L.J. 831, 836 (1983) ("The patent system that Congress created reflects a tradeoff
between dynamic and static efficiency.").
44. Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory of Intellectual
Property, 88 VA. L. REv. 1455, 1504-08 (2002) (suggesting the limits at which the losses due
to static inefficiency outweigh the gains in dynamic efficiency).
45. See, e.g., America Invents Act, H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. § 22 (2011) (enacted) (ending fee
diversion for the PTO); America Invents Act, S. 23, in1th Cong. § 20(C) (2011) (also




have suggested that patent examinations should be eliminated altogether, with
patent examination reverting to a simple system of registration akin to the
copyright regime. Still others have argued that the problems should be left to
the federal courts to sort out.47
Many of these proposals have been coupled with suggestions for
meaningful inter partes post-grant administrative review, a mechanism by
which potential infringers can challenge a patent's validity without
undertaking expensive litigation in federal courts.48 A system of inter partes
review already exists, but it imposes such disadvantages on third-party
challengers that it is almost never used.4 1 Some scholars recommend a multi-
tiered system of patent review in which applicants can opt for one of several
levels of PTO scrutiny with correspondingly strong ex post presumptions of
2008) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl) ("Fee diversion unquestionably has a negative impact on
the patent system. In recent years, it has hampered PTO's ability to hire an adequate
number of examiners."); JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 5, at 179-91 (proposing that the PTO
expend greater funds on more rigorous examination); John R. Allison & Starling D. Hunter,
On the Feasibility of Improving Patent Quality One Technology at a Time: The Case of Business
Methods, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 729, 734 (20o6); Paul R. Michel & Henry R. Nothhaft,
Op-Ed, Inventing Our Way Out of Joblessness, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 5, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2olo/o8/o6/opinion/o6nothhaft.html.
46. F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and Economics of Present Patent-
Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REv. 55 (2003); Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson
Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent "Privilege" in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L.
REV. 953, 999, 1009 (2007) (noting that the early Patent Office used what amounted in
practice to a registration system for patents and suggesting that this history is relevant to
modern patent policy debates).
47. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 25, at 104-07; Lemley, supra note 5, at 1511 (arguing that further
investment in patent scrutiny, because it must be spread across hundreds of thousands of
patents per year, would result in little gain in the quality of issued patents).
48. See, e.g., JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 5, at 184-86; Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges,
Incentives To Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won't Reliably Fix Patent Office
Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943 (2004).
49. In 2010 there were 224 actions for inter partes review, an all-time high. However, 196 of
them were related to already pending litigation, meaning that there were only 28 distinct
inter partes review cases. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 137 tbl.13 B (2010), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/2o0lo/USPTOFY2oloPAR.pdf This was during a
year in which the PTO issued 233,127 patents. Id. at 129 tbl.6. One principal reason that so
few parties used inter partes review was that a challenger in an inter partes proceeding is
estopped from further litigation of any issue that it raised or could have raised during the
inter partes action. 35 U.S.C. 5 315(c) (20o6). This is too great a sacrifice for parties that
might later want to litigate in federal court. The America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29,
125 Stat. 284 (1oii), makes a number of important changes to these inter partes proceedings
but includes the same estoppel provisions and thus is unlikely to be used much more widely.
Id. at S 32S(e), 125 Stat. at 308.
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validity.so And even more exotic proposals abound, including suggestions for
tradable patent rights that would limit the number of patents in force at any
given time," or even private competition in the market for patent
examination. 2 Finally, some commentators have begun to suggest abolishing
the Federal Circuit entirely and returning to the prior system of jurisdictional
competition between the generalist courts of appeal.5 1
Finding the correct solution depends, of course, on correctly diagnosing the
problem. It is possible that some or all of the factors described above-funding,
management, lack of expertise, capture, and ideology 4 -have contributed to
the proliferation of invalid patents and the unflagging expansion of patent
rights. Nonetheless, this Article aims to demonstrate that the patent system's
failings can be explained instead as a consequence of the contorted institutional
relationship between the PTO and the Federal Circuit.
II. PATENT EXPANSION
This Part presents a model of the interaction between three principal
actors: the Federal Circuit, the PTO, and a patent applicant. The basic model
proceeds in four stages. First, the patent applicant applies to the PTO for a
patent. Second, the PTO decides whether to grant the patent. Officially, the
PTO is an agent of the Federal Circuit; its role is to grant only those patents
that the Federal Circuit would allow under governing law.ss Third, if the PTO
denies the patent, the applicant decides whether to appeal that denial to the
Federal Circuit.5' And fourth, the Federal Circuit decides the appeal (if there is
one).
50. See, e.g., Lemley et al., supra note 5, at 12-13; Kristen Osenga, Entrance Ramps, Tolls, and
Express Lanes -Proposals for Decreasing Traffic Congestion in the Patent Office, 33 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 119,141-51 (2005).
s1. Ayres & Parchomovsky, supra note 37, at 870.
52. Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 31, at 1576 (suggesting that private patent examination
firms be allowed to compete with the PTO).
53. E.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 2, at 804 ("Another idea would be to abolish the Federal Circuit
and reconstitute it as a trial court."); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-
Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1102 (2003) ("I
discuss whether the best solution would involve abolishing the Federal Circuit, and having a
system of specialized trial courts reviewed by generalist appellate courts.").
54. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
55, See supra note 4.
56. To be precise, inventors whose patents were rejected by the PTO examiner may appeal to




Following attitudinal models of judging, which describe judges as having
an "ideal point" 7 _ the point along a continuum of possible outcomes where
they would prefer the law to land-the model describes Federal Circuit judges
as having an "ideal point" regarding patentability.? That is, along any given
dimension of patentability (novelty, enablement, etc.), each judge, were she
left to her own devices, would draw a line at a given point and allow patents up
to that point and no further. This ideal point is better described as a
"cutpoint," in the sense that it represents the cutoff between patentability and
nonpatentability." This notion of cutpoints is not limited to the Federal
Circuit; the PTO has cutpoints along any given dimension as well. These
cutpoints can be represented graphically. For instance, Figure i displays a
hypothetical PTO cutpoint on the issue of utility:
within the PTO. See 35 U.S.C. § 6(b) (2006) ("The Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences shall, on written appeal of an applicant, review adverse decisions of examiners
upon applications for patents . . . ."); John F. Duffy, Are Administrative Patent Judges
Unconstitutional?, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 904, 907-o8 (2009). (The America Invents Act
renames the BPAI as the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), America Invents Act,
Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 135(), 125 Stat. 284, 290 (2011), but for simplicity I will continue to
refer to it as the BPAI.) Applicants who do not like the result before the BPAI can then
appeal to the Federal Circuit. As later sections will explain, however, the BPAI is
substantially influenced by the top PTO administrators. See infra note 1o6. Because these
administrators control all significant decisionmakers within the agency, and in the interest
of simplicity, I will refer to the PTO as if it were a unitary actor, rather than distinguishing
between examiners and the BPAI.
57. E.g., GLENDON SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND: THE ATTITUDES AND IDEOLOGIES OF
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 1946-1963, at 220 (1965); see also Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D.
Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. Sci. REv.
557 (1989) (quantifying Justices' ideological preferences).
s8. See Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, Judicial Fact Discretion, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 18-20
(2008) (employing an ideal point-based model); Pauline T. Kim, Deliberation and Strategy on
the United States Courts ofAppeals: An Empirical Exploration ofPanel Effects, 157 U. PA. L. REv.
1319, 1347 (2009) (employing an ideal point model of judging); Alexander Volokh, Choosing
Interpretive Methods: A Positive Theory of Judges and Everyone Else, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 769,
780-82 (2008) (explaining the use of ideal points in decision models).
5g. See Lee Epstein et al., Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court justices: Who, When, and How
Important?, 101 Nw. U. L. REv. 1483, 1529-30 (2007) (describing the lines demarcating
decisions between voting one way or the other on a case as cutpoints); Keith Krehbiel,
Committee Power, Leadership, and the Median Voter: Evidence from the Smoking Ban,
12 J.L. ECON. &ORG. 234, 252 (1996) (employing a cutpoint-based model).
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Figure 1.
THE PTO CUTPOINT ON UTILITY
PTO cutpoint Invention for which
Extremely no utility can be
useful invention demonstrated
One can imagine the universe of possible inventions arrayed on the line
from left to right in order of decreasing utility: on the far left are inventions
that are obviously and incontrovertibly useful; on the far right are inventions
with no demonstrated utility. The PTO will grant patents on inventions that
fall to the left of its cutpoint and deny patents on inventions that fall to the right
of its cutpoint. The further to the right an actor's cutpoint is located, the more
patents that actor would grant -and thus the more lenient are that actor's
standards for patentability.
There are, of course, many different dimensions to patentability. Among
other things, a patent must recite valid subject matter,o and it must be novel,6
nonobvious, 6 and useful. 63 Each actor-the Patent and Trademark Office, and
each judge of the Federal Circuit-has a cutpoint for each of these issues. In
addition, the Federal Circuit more generally has a cutpoint that represents the
patents it would grant under its own governing precedent. For instance, the
Federal Circuit and the PTO might have the following cutpoints on the issue of
patentable subject matter:
Figure 2.
PTO AND FEDERAL CIRCUIT CUTPOINTS ON PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER
Classically patentable Federal Circuit PTO cutpoint Highly dubious
invention, such as farm cutpoint subject matter, such
machinery as laws of nature
4 1
6o. E.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (patentability of living organism).
61. E.g., In re Robertson, 169 F.3d 743 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (novelty).
62. E.g., KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (obviousness).
63. E.g., Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966) (doctrine of specific utility); In re Brana,




In this example, the PTO is more permissive than the Federal Circuit, as
represented by the fact that its cutpoint is to the right of the Federal Circuit's.
Two final notes are in order. First, the analysis that follows begins with the
simplest case: a completely error-free PTO and a completely error-free Federal
Circuit, both of which grant all patents to the left of their cutpoints and deny
all patents to the right of their cutpoints. This is obviously unrealistic; no court
or agency can be perfectly accurate in all circumstances. Any actor will
occasionally grant patents that are to the right of its cutpoint or deny patents
that are to the left of its cutpoint, purely as a matter of error or internal
institutional disagreements.6 4 The simple case is used merely to establish the
basic building blocks of the model. Later sections drop the assumption of
perfect accuracy and present a more realistic picture of the interaction between
the PTO and the Federal Circuit.
Second, the analysis proceeds as if there were only one dimension to
patentability, and it often speaks of "patentability" as a placeholder for any of
the various doctrines -patentable subject matter,6s novelty,66 enablement, 67
utility,68 and so forth-that determine whether an application is patentable.
Nonetheless, it is entirely generalizable to any number of dimensions -what is
true for one dimension should be true for all of them. The theory that follows
is indeed meant to apply to all doctrines related to whether an invention is
patentable.
A. Error-Free PTO and Federal Circuit
Consider first an error-free PTO, an error-free and entirely homogenous
Federal Circuit, and a strategic patent applicant. The Federal Circuit will set
the appropriate limits of patentability, and the PTO will follow those limits to
the letter. Under these circumstances, the PTO will grant only those patents
that are genuinely patentable under governing Federal Circuit law, and because
the PTO makes no errors, the Federal Circuit will uphold its decision if any
aggrieved patentee appeals. Accordingly, strategic patentees will only apply for
64. For instance, some judges on the Federal Circuit may be more lenient than others, and an
appeal may turn on which panel of three judges is selected to hear it. I discuss this at greater
length below. See infra notes 78-82.
65. See 35 U.S.C. 5 101 (20o6).
66. See id. 5 102.
67. See id. 5 112.
68. See id. § o1.
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patents on inventions that they know to be patentable. The system will
function ideally.
B. Error-Prone or Noisy PTO, Error-Free Federal Circuit
Now imagine that the PTO is not perfect but instead will make random
errors when examining patent applications, sometimes granting patents that it
should not," and sometimes denying patents that should be granted."o The
errors will cluster around the PTO's cutpoint: the closer an application is to the
cutpoint, the more likely the PTO is to err in examining it.7 ' In other words,
the PTO will be less likely to incorrectly decide patent applications that are
obviously patentable or obviously unpatentable. Figure 3 represents this
phenomenon graphically. The shaded area represents the set of patent
applications that the PTO might decide incorrectly; the darker the shading, the
more likely the PTO is to err.
Figure 3.
THE PTO'S CUTPOINT, WITH ERROR RANGES
PTO cutpoint
Stricter patentability More permissive
standard patentability standard
The PTO thus produces four types of decisions: false negatives (patents it
should grant but instead denies); false positives (patents it should deny but
instead grants); true negatives (patents it should deny and does); and true
positives (patents it should grant and does). The following figure represents
these categories graphically:
69. Again, "should" is meant in reference to governing Federal Circuit law. The PTO should
grant all patents that are allowable according to the Federal Circuit and should deny all
patents that are not.
70. The precise source of the error is not important. One possibility is that these errors could be
due to simple mistakes by examiners and the difficulties inherent to accurately examining a
patent.






TRUE AND FALSE POSITIVES AND NEGATIVES AT THE PTO
PTO SHOULD GRANT PTO SHOULD DENY
PATENT PATENT
True positive False positive
z z
False negative True negative
Imagine further that the Federal Circuit is again error-free. When the PTO
erroneously denies a patent (a false negative), the aggrieved party can appeal to
the Federal Circuit." The Federal Circuit will then reverse the PTO. But when
the Patent Office grants a patent, there is no opposing private party positioned
to challenge that patent in court, and thus no opportunity for the Federal
Circuit to correct the PTO's error." Only PTO actions on one side of the ledger
are appealed directly to the federal courts.74 Strategic patent applicants will
thus understand that there is some chance that the PTO will grant them a
patent on an unpatentable invention. Accordingly, patent applicants will file
some number of patent applications that they believe to be unpatentable,
hoping to get lucky at the PTO. The number of these attempts will depend on
the PTO's rate of error and the cost of filing for a patent.7s
72. This is relatively rare, of course. The far more common course of action is for the private
party to file a series of continuation patents with the Patent Office until the examiner finally
agrees to grant the patent. Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent
Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63, 74-75 (2003).
73. The PTO does provide for limited inter partes review of patents, but this procedure is very
rarely used because it is costly for the challenging party. See supra note 49.
74. That is not to say that improperly granted patents never wind up in federal court. They do,
in the context of suits for infringement. Yet they arrive there in smaller numbers -and after
greater delay -than patents based on applications denied. I explore this in greater detail
infra Subsection II.D.5.
75. See Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Screens and Patent Examination, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIs 687, 700
(2oo) (cataloguing the costs involved in obtaining a patent).
487
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Under these circumstances, if the costs of appealing to the Federal Circuit
are low enough, few patents will be improperly denied: any applicant whose
patent is wrongly denied can simply appeal, and the Federal Circuit will grant
the patent. However, some number of invalid patents will be improperly
granted by the PTO and never appealed. In that respect, this arrangement
bears some resemblance to reality-most observers agree that the patent
system is rife with improperly granted patents.
C. Error-Free PTO, Error-Prone or Noisy Federal Circuit
1. Issued Patents
Now imagine that the PTO is error-free - it grants or denies every
application precisely in accordance with governing Federal Circuit law. But
suppose that the Federal Circuit is error-prone, or that its behavior is "noisy"
with respect to its cutpoint. The Federal Circuit will usually deny applications
that are to the right of the cutpoint (meaning that the patent would normally
be invalid under existing precedent) and approve applications that are to the
left of the cutpoint (meaning that the patent would be valid under existing
precedent). However, it will occasionally grant invalid patents or deny valid
ones. Like the error-prone PTO from the prior section, the Federal Circuit's
errors are clustered around its cutpoint. The more obviously patentable or
unpatentable an invention is, the less likely the circuit is to decide the case
improperly. Figure 5 represents this graphically:
Figure 5.
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S CUTPOINT, WITH ERROR RANGES
Federal Circuit
Stricter patentability cutpoint More permissive
standard patentability standard
This error or noise could derive from a variety of sources. It might be the
result of the technological difficulties inherent in ascertaining the patentability




of an invention; even experienced judges will frequently make legal errors.77
Alternatively, what appear to be errors in Federal Circuit patent grants or
denials might instead be the result of random panel assignments within the
circuit. The cutpoint for the Federal Circuit as a whole is determined by its
median judge -the judge who holds the deciding vote in en banc cases .' But
other judges may have more or less expansive views of the scope of
patentability than the median judge. In fact, there is ample evidence that
judges of the Federal Circuit are highly heterogeneous when it comes to issues
of patent validity. For instance, John Allison and Mark Lemley found that
individual Federal Circuit judges' rates of voting in favor of validity range from
33.3% (Judge Baldwin) to 75.6% (Judge Newman) across substantial numbers
of votes.so In other words, some judges may be more than twice as likely to
vote to hold a patent valid than other judges-and that is despite the
moderating effects of serving on a panel with two other judges, an effect that
usually tempers judicial extremes. 8 ' If two judges with more expansive or less
expansive views of patentability find themselves on the same panel, they may
decide to issue a decision that deviates in one direction or another from the
cutpoint of the Federal Circuit as a whole.
77. See David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction
Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REv. 223 (2008) (finding no significant
relationship between experience and the number of errors a district court judge will make in
ruling on issues of patent claim construction). In addition, Federal Circuit judges may be
experienced, but they are not particularly expert. See supra note 33.
78. See Duncan Black, On the Rationale of Group Decision-Making, 56 J. POL. ECON. 23, 29 (1948)
(explaining that the median member of a decision-making body will control the outcomes of
majority votes); Frank B. Cross, Collegial Ideology in the Courts, 103 Nw. U. L. REv. 1399,
1418-19 (2009) ("The median voter theorem states that outcomes and opinions are dictated
exclusively by the ideologically median member of the panel."); cf Lee Epstein & Tonja
Jacobi, Super Medians, 61 STAN. L. REv. 37, 44-49 (2008) (discussing the role of the median
judge on the Supreme Court).
79. See Lee Petherbridge, Patent Law Uniformity?, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 421, 446-48 (2009)
(finding substantial differences in outcomes amongst Federal Circuit judges).
so. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, How Federal Circuit Judges Vote in Patent Validity Cases,
27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 745, 756 (2000).
81. See, e.g., Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REv. 831,
835-41 (2008) (discussing "panel effects" in judging).
82. See Joshua B. Fischman, Estimating Preferences of Circuit Judges: A Model of "Consensus
Voting," 54 J.L. & ECON (forthcoming 2011); cf Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz
& Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295
(2007) (finding large disparities in the treatment of immigrant asylum applicants by
different asylum officers and immigration judges).
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There is, however, the matter of existing precedent. Judges who disagree
with the Federal Circuit's position on patentability will nonetheless feel bound
to some degree by existing precedent and unable to simply decide cases as they
might wish." On the other hand, circuit precedent is not entirely binding;
judges deviate from precedent on regular occasions, especially in the Federal
Circuit, where inconsistent, competing legal approaches often persist for
years." In keeping with standard legal and political science models of judicial
behavior, I assume that a judge's likelihood of voting to grant a patent is a
function of the judge's own view of patent law (that is, the judge's cutpoint);
existing circuit precedent (that is, the Federal Circuit's cutpoint); and where
the patent itself falls relative to those cutpoints." The farther the patent is to
the left (right) of the judge's cutpoint, the more likely the judge is to grant
(deny) the patent.8 And the farther a judge would have to deviate from
existing precedent in order to grant or deny a patent, the less likely she is to do
SO. 8
Under these circumstances, patentees with patentable inventions will
continue to apply for patents. Their patents will always be granted by the PTO,
and there will be no need to appeal to the Federal Circuit. There will be no false
negatives -patents that should be granted but are not. However, some
inventors with unpatentable inventions will also file for patents. They will
understand that after the PTO denies their applications they can appeal to the
Federal Circuit, and there is a chance that they will draw favorable (or errant)
panels that will overturn the PTO's decisions and grant their patents. The
number of such patentees who file for patents on unpatentable inventions will
83. W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Toward a Theory ofPrecedent in Arbitration, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1895, 1925 (2010) ("[P]recedent constrains the discretion of future decision makers to some
meaningful degree.").
84. See infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text (describing the intracircuit conflict over the
proper methodology of patent claim construction).
8s. This approach is drawn from spatial voting models and has gained wide acceptance. See,
e.g., Jonathan Bendor & Adam Meirowitz, Spatial Models ofDelegation, 98 AM. POL. Sc. REV.
293 (2004) (employing a spatial model to explain delegation decisions); Kim, supra note 58,
at 1347 (using a spatial model to analyze judicial voting); Keith T. Poole & Howard
Rosenthal, A Spatial Model for Legislative Roll Call Analysis, 29 AM. J. POL. Sci. 357 (1985)
(using a spatial model to explain congressional voting); Erik Voeten, Legislator Preferences,
Ideal Points, and the Spatial Model in the European Parliament (Ctr. on Insts. & Governance,
Working Paper No. 6, 2005), http://igovberkeley.com/sites/default/files/No6_Voeten.pdf
(analyzing European voting with a spatial model).
86. Cf Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Paradox of Expansionist Statutory
Interpretations, ioi Nw. U. L. REv. 1207, 1223-30 (2007) (using a spatial model to explain
judges' statutory interpretation decisions).




depend on the costs and benefits involved: the cost of applying for a patent and
appealing to the Federal Circuit, and the value of the patent if it issues,
discounted by the likelihood that the Federal Circuit will uphold the PTO's
decision. There will be few of these patentees (depending on these
parameters), but there will not be zero. In other words, this institutional
arrangement will generate some false positives - patents granted by the Federal
Circuit that should not exist.
2. The Contours ofPatent Law
The effects of such a system do not end with the fact that some bad patents
will issue. In addition, this arrangement will have important, perhaps
pernicious, consequences for the shape of patent law itself. In any appeal from
a denial by the PTO, the Federal Circuit has essentially two options: a) affirm
the Patent Office's denial, or b) reverse the PTO and grant the patent.88 If the
Federal Circuit affirms the PTO, it will likely do so based on governing circuit
precedent, which the PTO followed."* Patent law will remain unchanged. But
if it reverses the PTO and grants the patent, it will necessarily have created a
new precedent, one that supports a broader scope of patentability, and one that
will exert an influence on Federal Circuit judges going forward.
The strength of these new precedents - and thus the extent to which the
boundaries of patentability expand -will depend on the reason for the Federal
Circuit's departure from settled law."o If the Federal Circuit has simply
88. It can also vacate and remand for further consideration, but for present purposes that is
operationally equivalent to reversing the PTO's decision.
89. Cf William A. Klein, Tailor to the Emperor with No Clothes: The Supreme Court's Tax Rules for
Deposits and Advance Payments, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1685, 1725 (1994) (describing the manner in
which lawyers offer, and courts generally follow, arguments based on existing precedent). It
is possible that repeated affirmations of existing law will effectively entrench those legal
rules, making them more difficult to overturn. At the same time, it is possible that these
seriatim affirmances will have zero or little effect. Yet even if the circuit's many affirmances
exert some sort of inertial pull on patent law, this will only slow the rate of change, not
eliminate it entirely.
go. It is well beyond the scope of this paper to elucidate an entire theory of precedent. Instead, I
rely upon standard existing theories of how precedent impacts judicial behavior. See, e.g.,
Yeon-Koo Che & Jong Goo Yi, The Role of Precedents in Repeated Litigation, 9 J.L. EcoN. &
ORG. 399, 404-o6 (1993) (developing a model of precedent regarding commonly litigated
questions); Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, The Evolution of Common Law, 115 J. POL.
ECON. 43, 53-57 (2007) (setting forth a theory of precedent and common law development);
Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, Overruling and the Instability ofLaw, 35 J. CoMP. EcoN.
309, 323-24 (2007) (arguing that overruling precedent leads to instability and prevents the
common law from evolving toward efficiency); Stefanie A. Lindquist & Frank B. Cross,
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misjudged the invention's technology or misapplied the law, the precedent will
likely have little value.9 ' But where the Federal Circuit offers a new statement
of law, the new precedent will exert force.9 2 This is the case regardless of
whether the court states this new legal rule intentionally -as a consequence of
the panel composition-or unintentionally, as a result of error. These decisions
will inflate the patent law, expanding the range of what is patentable.
Moreover, these legal expansions by the Federal Circuit will generate
positive feedback effects. As the Federal Circuit's cutpoint moves with the
creation of new precedent, so too will the PTO's. Every time the Federal Circuit
moves the law, the PTO will respond accordingly, becoming slightly more
permissive in granting patents. And because the only appeals that the Federal
Circuit will see relate to applications that exceed this new cutpoint, it will
continuously be presented with new opportunities to move the law even further.
The inflationary cycle will repeat itself.
This process is not wholly unconstrained, however. In the Federal Circuit,
one panel cannot overrule an opinion issued by another.93 Only the court
sitting en banc may do so.94 Accordingly, no three-judge panel has the power
to enact genuinely wholesale change. Nonetheless, newer panel opinions can
chip away at old doctrines by creating exceptions or reaching opposite
conclusions in analogous situations, even when they do not directly overrule
existing precedent.95 These new panel opinions then exert precedential force of
Empirically Testing Dworkin's Chain Novel Theory: Studying the Path ofPrecedent, 8o N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1156, 1203-o6 (2005) (providing empirical data on how judges behave with respect to
precedent); Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 61-63
(1977) (arguing that the common law evolves toward efficiency because of rational decisions
by litigants and judicial responses to those decisions); Frederick Schauer, Precedent,
39 STAN. L. REv. 571, 581-98 (1987) (offering a complete theory of precedent).
91. See Schauer, supra note go, at 591-96 (explaining that precedent will be of little value when
it covers only a very narrow category of cases).
92. See id. at 592-95 (categorizing the strength of legal precedents).
93. FED CIR. R. 35, available at http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/rules-of-practice/
rules.pdf. This is in contrast to other courts of appeals that do allow one three-judge panel
to overrule another. For instance, Seventh Circuit Local Rule 40(e) states:
A proposed opinion approved by a panel of this court adopting a position which
would overrule a prior decision of this court or create a conflict between or among
circuits shall not be published unless it is first circulated among the active
members of this court and a majority of them do not vote to rehear en banc the
issue of whether the position should be adopted.
7TH CIR. R. 40(e), available at http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/Rules/rules.pdf.
94. FED CIR. R. 35 ("Although only the court en banc may overrule a binding precedent....").
9s. See Christopher J. Peters, Foolish Consistency: On Equality, Integrity and Justice in Stare Decisis,




their own in future cases, even cases that the Federal Circuit hears en banc." In
addition, the Federal Circuit is infamous for allowing apparently contradictory
panel opinions to coexist for extended periods of time. For instance, for several
years the circuit had two separate doctrines of claim interpretation." Both
stemmed from panel opinions,98 and both claimed some number of adherents
until the court, sitting en banc, discarded one in favor of the other." The
Federal Circuit is also generally reluctant to take cases en banc, having heard
only forty-four cases en banc during the twenty-nine-year existence of the
court at the time of this writing.' Accordingly, the fact that this effect is
limited to panel opinions may curb its impact but will not eliminate it.
Still, the Federal Circuit will not function entirely as a one-way ratchet. The
court could always seize upon a patent that the PTO has denied as a vehicle for
retrenchment. The circuit could use the case to move the boundaries of
patentability backwards, rather than merely affirming the PTO based on
settled law. These cases will be rare, however, in part because they require the
ingenuity in 'distinguishing' unfavorable precedents that otherwise would be 'controlling"').
Compare Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. ill, iII (1969) (describing the case as "simple" and
holding that there was a violation of the appellant's First Amendment rights without
mentioning conflicting precedent in Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951)), with Feiner v.
New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) (finding no violation of the First Amendment in a hostile
audience case). See also Fredrick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 408 & n.21
(1985), which suggests that the Court was "selectively avoiding problems" by failing to
mention Feiner in Gregory while calling Gregory a "simple case."
96. Schauer, supra note go, at 589.
97. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F-3 d 1303, 1312-14 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (explaining the history of
the circuit's rules on claim construction).
98. One approach focused on the literal meaning of claim terms as interpreted using
dictionaries. See Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3 d 1193, 1201-05 (Fed. Cir.
2002). The other employed a more holistic approach. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic,
Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582-86 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
99. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312 (adopting the Vitronics approach). Despite Phillips, intra-circuit
conflict over the proper methodology for construing claims continues. Compare Markem-
Imaje Corp. v. Zipher Ltd., 657 F.3 d 1293, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ("That a device will only
operate if certain elements are included is not grounds to incorporate those elements into
the construction of the claims."), with Retractable Technologies, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson &
Co., 653 F. 3d 1296, 1305 (Fed. Cit. 2011) ("In reviewing the intrinsic record to construe the
claims, we strive to capture the scope of the actual invention, rather than strictly limit the
scope of claims to disclosed embodiments or allow the claim language to become divorced
from what the specification conveys is the invention.").
100. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Determining Uniformity Within the Federal Circuit by Measuring
Dissent and En Banc Review, 43 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 801, 817 (2010) (observing that the Federal
Circuit goes en banc in a smaller proportion of cases than most other circuits); Ryan G.
Vacca, Acting like an Administrative Agency: The Federal Circuit En Banc, 76 Mo. L. REv.
(forthcoming 2011), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract id=1781277.
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judges of the Federal Circuit to deviate from settled precedent in order to
decide a case that they could decide simply by adhering to that precedent. This
is something that courts have counseled against, and that judges are famously
reluctant to do.'o
In addition, any patent that the PTO has granted -from the most mundane
and uncontroversial to those at the vanguard of current law-could be the
subject of an infringement action, and thus the full panoply of allowed patents
could still find their way to the Federal Circuit at one point or another.
Infringement lawsuits involving patents well within the scope of existing law
could provide the Federal Circuit with opportunities to dial back the reach of
patentability.
On the whole, will the scope of patentability expand or contract? This will
depend on how many true positives and true negatives come before the Federal
Circuit. The true negatives will be patent applications that are denied by the
PTO and appealed directly to the Federal Circuit; the true positives will be
patents that the PTO properly grants that eventually find their way to the
Federal Circuit in the course of infringement lawsuits. (There will be no false
positives or false negatives because, by assumption, the PTO is unerring.) True
positives (along with false negatives) allow the Federal Circuit opportunities to
contract the scope of patentability, because reversing the PTO would involve
narrowing the boundaries of what is patentable. True negatives (and false
positives) provide opportunities for expansion because reversing the PTO
involves broadening the boundaries of what is patentable.
Legal change will thus occur stochastically: each case that reaches the
Federal Circuit will present some probability that the court will inflate or
contract the law by deciding the case in a manner that does not accord with
existing doctrine."o2 A given case could lead to a larger or smaller change in the
101. See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 384 n.1o (1996) (expressing
a reluctance to decide cases on any broader or more difficult ground than absolutely
necessary); Michael J. Gerhardt, Constitutional Humility, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 23, 26 (2007)
(describing how influential judges have advocated for this type of narrow approach);
Jonathan T. Molot, Principled Minimalism: Restriking the Balance Between Judicial
Minimalism and Neutral Principles, 90 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1788-91 (2004) (explaining that the
need to muster a majority on panels and the desire to avoid criticism limit judges to the
narrowest grounds necessary to reach a decision); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Judicial
Minimalism, 43 TULSA L. REv. 825, 836 (20o8) (pointing out that institutional realities and
implications for future decisions both make narrow decisions the sensible choice).
102. Cf Anna M. Michalak, Environmental Contamination with Multiple Potential Sources and the
Common Law: Current Approaches and Emerging Opportunities, 14 FORDHAM ENvTL. L. REv.
147, 160 (2002) ("[C]ommon law is statistical or stochastic in nature, because it deals
directly with the uncertainty associated with estimates."); Charles Yablon, The Meaning of




law depending on the patent being granted or denied: if the Federal Circuit
grants a truly outlandish patent or invalidates a previously uncontroversial one,
the law will move substantially. If the patent at issue was much closer to the
court's existing cutpoint, the change in the law will be more minor. Different
precedents might also carry different weights, depending on how they are
written."o' But because it is a matter of random chance whether a court departs
from existing law in a given case, overall change in the law will likely be
proportional to the number of opportunities that a court has to alter the law in
expansionary and contractive directions.
There will of course be many more patents granted than denied by the
PTO, but relatively few of those patents will ever be subject to suits for
infringement, much less suits that reach the Federal Circuit. For instance, in
2010, the PTO granted more than ioo patents for each patent infringement or
inequitable conduct case that the Federal Circuit adjudicated on the merits."0 4
As a result, the net effect on the scope of patentability is indeterminate-at least
in this contrived scenario. Given a more realistic picture of the PTO and
Federal Circuit, the results are not so indefinite.
D. The Patent Office and Federal Circuit in Reality
The previous Sections demonstrated that on certain assumptions the
interaction between the PTO and the Federal Circuit can generate both invalid
patents and an inflationary (or deflationary) bias in patent law. However, those
assumptions were not all realistic, and deliberately so. The preceding Sections
were meant only to lay the theoretical groundwork for an analysis of the
interaction between the two institutional bodies. This Section takes up that
task.
REV. 899, 962-63 ("[T]here are some stochastic elements involved in the litigation process
(jurors and judges are randomly assigned to cases) . . . .").
103. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text (observing that precedents based on errors or
factual distinctions will carry less weight than those founded upon new statements of law).
104. Compare Patent Tech. Monitoring Team, U.S. Patent Statistics Chart: Calendar Years 1963-
2010, PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/
us stat.htm (last modified May 13, 2011) (showing that the PTO granted 244,341 patents in
2010), with Appeals Filed and Adjudicated, by Category, FY 2010, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR
THE FED. CIR., http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/thecourt/statistics/Caseload-by
CategoryTable of Data 201o.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2011) (showing that merits panels
of the Federal Circuit adjudicated 220 patent cases arising from district courts in fiscal year
2010).
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1. The PTO
This Subsection gives an account of what the Patent Office attempts to
achieve when it examines patents. As described above, the PTO's official
responsibility is to allow those patents that would be valid under the best
possible interpretation of governing law.' Officially then, the PTO is expected
to match its cutpoint to the Federal Circuit's. The patent system is designed
such that the PTO is expected to grant only valid patents, per the legal
definitions created by these other institutional actors, and to deny all other
applications.
The PTO, as an institution, undoubtedly pursues this objective to at least
some extent. But from the perspective of the individuals who actually manage
the PTO (and those who examine patents), the PTO's institutional interest in
enforcing the "correct" boundaries of patent law is actually quite weak.' The
patent rules are not the PTO's own legal boundaries -they were created by the
Federal Circuit."o' Accordingly, PTO officials are likely to lack any significant
personal investment in the contours of the rules, and it is unlikely that any high
official will stand to reap significant psychic or reputational benefits if the PTO
1os. See supra note 4.
106. Again, to be precise, inventors whose applications have been denied may appeal to the BPAI,
an administrative court within the PTO, before taking their cases before the Federal Circuit.
See 35 U.S.C. 5 6(b) (2006) (establishing the BPAI); supra note 56. However, the BPAI is
not an independent body. To the contrary, it resides under the control of senior PTO
officials. The membership of the BPAI includes the PTO Director, the Deputy
Commissioner, the Commissioner for Patents, and the Commissioner for Trademarks, as
well as administrative patent judges. 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (20o6). These administrative patent
judges are appointed by the Secretary of Commerce, "in consultation with the Director" of
the PTO. Id. In effect, this means that the PTO Director controls the appointments. The
judges do not have Article III tenure and salary protection. See id. In addition, the PTO
Director has the authority "to designate BPAI panels that he 'hopes will render the decision
he desires, even upon rehearing."' Duffy, supra note 56, at 908 (quoting In re Alappat,
33 F.3 d 1526, 1535 (Fed. Cit. 1994)). Moreover, before a decision of the BPAI acquires
precedential force -that is, before it can bind examiners or the BPAI itself in the future-
that decision must be approved by the PTO Director. Publication of Opinions of the Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE (Jan. 23, 2007),
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/con/sol/og/2007/weeko4/patopin.htm. As a purely legal
matter, it is undoubtedly the case that BPAI judges are not "alter ego[s] or agent[s]" of the
PTO Commissioner. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1535-36. But senior PTO administrators exert
effective control over the law that emanates from the BPAI (as well as the more quotidian
activities of examiners). Accordingly, this Article's analysis will treat the interests of the
agency at large as mirroring those of its senior management.
107. Again, Congress and the Supreme Court certainly play a role in the creation of patent law,




holds fast to existing law.os More importantly, there is no indication that PTO
administrators are chosen based on their views of patent law and how those
views accord with governing Federal Circuit precedent."o' Adhering to the
Federal Circuit's conception of patent law would seem to hold little inherent
value for the Patent Office.
What else might the PTO and its top administrators wish to achieve when
granting or denying patents? Like most administrative heads, officials at the
PTO are interested in maximizing both their future career prospects and, to a
lesser extent, their leisure time.' Consider first the issue of an administrator's
career. The administrator's future career opportunities are driven in large
degree by her reputation."' Enhancing her reputation involves increasing the
size, prestige, and resources of her administration,"' on the theory that
1o8. See RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 40-41 (20o8) (describing the set of theories
positing that decisionmakers prefer to decide questions in accordance with views or ideas
they have constructed).
1o9. Presidential and congressional statements regarding nominees to head the PTO are
noticeably devoid of so much as an allusion to the individual's substantive views on patent
law, as opposed to his or her managerial experience. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the
White House Press Sec'y, President Obama Announces More Key Administration Posts
(June 18, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/President-Obama-Announces
-More- Key-Administration-Posts-6-18-o9 (statement of President Obama regarding PTO
Director David Kappos); Press Release, Office of Sen. Patrick Leahy, Comment on the
Designation of David J. Kappos To Be Undersecretary of Commerce for Intellectual
Property and Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (June 18, 2009),
http://leahy.senate.gov/press/press releases/release/?id=40 7 66b3c-7fa3-4c74-986e-d4378ae4665c.
iio. See WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 38 (1971)
("Among the several variables that may enter the bureaucrat's utility function are the
following: salary, perquisites of the office, public reputation, power, patronage, output of
the bureau, ease of making changes, and ease of managing the bureau."); Daryl Levinson,
Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 932-34 (2005)
(suggesting that agency bureaucrats are interested in maximizing discretionary budgets,
ideological preferences, and the goals of their constituents); Michael A. Livermore, Cause or
Cure? Cost-Benefit Analysis and Regulatory Gridlock, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 107, 120 (2008)
("There is a wide variety of other goods that agency heads could pursue -such as prestige,
nicer offices, intellectually stimulating work, leisure time, and future employment prospects
.); f Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in
Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1051, 1054 (1995) (arguing that
"respect, ideological utility, and leisure" are judges' maximands).
ws. See Mary K. Olson, Managing Delegation in the FDA: Reducing Delay in New-Drug Review,
29 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 397, 401 (2004) ("FDA regulators care about their own
professional reputations and the reputation of the agency because these reputations may
influence their career prospects in and out of government.").
112. ANDRE ILAis & STEPHANE DION, THE BUDGET-MAXIMIZING BUREAUCRAT: APPRAISAL AND
EVIDENCE 6 (1991) (describing one bureaucratic strategy as "mainly, but not exclusively,
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successfully managing an important organization demonstrates the
administrator's ability."3
In order to increase the size and importance of the PTO, the administrator
must satisfy those parties that control the Agency's budget: Congress and the
President, and, by extension, the community of private parties who interact
with the PTO and may lobby political actors for or against the Agency.11 4
However, these parties do not appear to have terribly strong preferences
regarding the substantive content of patent law. Until this year, Congress and
the President had not passed major legislation altering substantive patent law,
which indicates a willingness to cede the shaping of the law to the courts."s
This political apathy is likely due to the fact that private interests are arrayed
approximately equally for and against expansion in the scope of patent
rights."6 Notwithstanding this apparent equality, the PTO has assumed a
public posture of solicitude towards patent applicants, the class of private
actors most likely to prefer expansive patent scope. The PTO refers to them as
its "customers" and states that its mission is to serve their interests in obtaining
patents."7 Yet in the aggregate, it is unlikely that Congress, the President, and
private interests exert a strong pull on PTO behavior.
By contrast, the Federal Circuit holds the power to significantly and
directly affect the interests of the PTO's administrators. The mechanism is the
possibility of appeal and reversal. Like any administrative actor (or judge),
officials at the PTO presumably place a high value on avoiding being
reversed."' Reversals by the Federal Circuit are costly in reputational terms
targeted at budgetary increases"); NISKANEN, supra note 11o, at 38 (describing a bureaucrat's
reputation as "a positive monotonic function of the total budget of the bureau during the
bureaucrat's tenure in office").
113. NISKANEN, supra note 11o, at 36-42.
114. Id. at 24 (describing administrators' desire to satisfy their financial sponsors); Levinson,
supra note i1o, at 932-34 (same); Long, supra note 34, at 1984-88 (suggesting that the PTO
will often enlist the assistance of private parties in lobbying Congress for additional
funding).
115. Long, supra note 34, at 1968 ("Since 1952, Congress has not taken much interest in
amending the patent code, leaving the bulk of legal evolution to the courts.").
116. E.g., Clarisa Long, Institutions and Interest Groups in Patent and Copyright Law to (2007)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
117. See, e.g., U.S. TRADEMARK & PATENT OFFICE, WORKING FOR OUR CUSTOMERS: A PATENT
AND TRADEMARK OFFICE REVIEW (1994), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/
com/annual/1994/pgs-5.pdf.
118. Cf Albert A. Foer, The Politics ofAntitrust in the United States: Public Choice and Public
Choices, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 475, 492 nn.42-43 (2001) (explaining that a concern for




and can threaten top officials' employment and public standing, not to mention
their future employment prospects." Moreover, even appeals that the PTO
eventually wins are very costly to the Agency. Because the PTO is entirely self-
funded and operates on a fixed budget, 2 o each dollar it spends litigating is one
it cannot devote to hiring additional examiners, improving the quality of the
PTO workspace, increasing the salaries of current employees, or otherwise
providing material and nonmaterial benefits to the PTO workforce."'
Accordingly, even victorious appeals can reduce the leisure time available to the
PTO administrator and her subordinates.m' Top officials at the PTO thus have
strong incentives to avoid appeals, and in particular to avoid reversals.
maintain superior private-practice exit options); George A. Krause & James W. Douglas,
Institutional Design Versus Reputational Effects on Bureaucratic Performance: Evidence from U.S.
Government Macroeconomic and Fiscal Projections, 15 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 281, 282
(2005) (observing that bureaucrats will seek to preserve their own reputations, and thus will
avoid actions that might allow them to be "distinguished as inferior agents"); James P.
Timony, Performance Evaluation of Federal Administrative Law Judges, 7 ADMIN. L. REV. AM.
U. 629, 656 (1994) (explaining, with respect to administrative law judges, that "[j]udges
generally are extremely cautious about their professional reputation . . .. They do not like to
be reversed on appeal").
119. Cf RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAw 118-19 (1995) (describing judges' aversion to
reversal); Timony, supra note 118, at 656; Justin Fox & Matthew C. Stephenson, Judicial
Review and Democratic Failure 6-1o (Harvard Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working
Paper Series, Paper No. 09-47, 2009), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract id=14 586 32
(describing the reputational harm to bureaucrats and elected leaders from judicial reversals).
Of course, it is possible that being affirmed by the Federal Circuit is beneficial to the PTO's
reputation. But it is unlikely to be as beneficial as being reversed is harmful. Even if being
affirmed were equally important as being reversed, a risk-averse administrator would not
likely choose to gamble the prospect of being reversed against an opportunity to be
affirmed. And irrespective of this calculation, the PTO has an interest in avoiding appeals of
any sort for financial reasons.
120. JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 5, at II; Tony Dutra, Obama Signs Bill Increasing PTO Funding in
FY 201o, but Experts Say Not Enough, 8o Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 497, 497
(2010) (noting that the PTO will be permitted to keep additional funds that it has collected
and may spend the funds on "salaries and expenses"); Rai, supra note 30, at 2057 n.24
(" [T]he PTO is an entirely fee-funded organization.").
121. Tony Dutra, PTO Announces Spending Cutbacks; Track One Prioritized Examination a
Casualty, 81 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 853 (2011) (noting that the PTO will be
forced to implement numerous cutbacks because Congress declined to release to it all of the
fees it collected); Richard S. Markovits, On the Economic Efficiency of Using Law To Increase
Research and Development: A Critique of Various Tax, Antitrust, Intellectual Property, and Tort
Law Rules and Policy Proposals, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 63, so6 (2002) (explaining managers'
tendency to spend money on perks such as "nicer offices" when they cannot keep the
resources for themselves).
122. Arti Rai notes that the PTO "has not always been able to keep all of the fees that it collects ....
In the 1990s, for instance, Congress diverted hundreds of millions of dollars in fee revenues
499
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
These are certainly not the only motivations present among top officials at
the PTO. PTO officials undoubtedly have a whole spectrum of typical goals
and objectives. The point is not that they are singlemindedly focused on their
careers or the maximization of their own leisure time, to the exclusion of all
else. The point, rather, is a) that they are not strongly tied to any particular
conception of patent law, and b) that they have something very tangible to gain
from avoiding appeals and reversals, and essentially nothing to gain from being
appealed or reversed. Accordingly, PTO officials will tend to take actions that
stand to benefit them by limiting their exposure to appeals.
2. The Federal Circuit
With respect to the Federal Circuit, the story is much simpler. The Federal
Circuit, as the primary expositor of patent law, has a substantive, policy-driven
interest in the content of the law.' Judges have individual policy preferences
that shape their legal decisions. In addition, they would prefer not to be
overturned by the Supreme Court, a fact that limits their legal options to at
least some extent.'12
Other than substantive policy preferences, the objectives of Federal Circuit
judges are fairly limited. They are paid in lockstep with other appellate
from PTO coffers." Rai, supra note 30, at 2058 n.24; see also Figueroa v. United States, 66
Fed. Cl. 139, 143 (2005) (providing data on the percentage of fees the PTO has been allowed
to keep.) The newly passed America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011),
explicitly reserves all PTO fees for PTO activities, and would seem on its face to end this
practice of fee diversion. See id. at § 22(a) (4) (2), 125 Stat. at 336 ("If fee collections by the
Patent and Trademark Office for a fiscal year exceed the amount appropriated to the Office
for that fiscal year, fees collected in excess of the appropriated amount shall be . . . made
available until expended only for obligation and expenditure by the Office . . . "). Of course,
a future Congress could simply override this provision in an appropriations law, again
diverting PTO fees to other parts of the government. See Tony Dutra, Lobbying Groups
Accept Patent Reform, but Vow To Hold Congress to PTO Funding, 82 Pat. Trademark &
Copyright J. (BNA) 632 (2011). The actions of one Congress cannot impede the actions of a
future Congress. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Essay, Legislative Entrenchment: A
Reappraisal, 111 YALE L.J. 1665, 1665 (2002).
123. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text (describing the attitudinal model of judging,
which is driven largely by judges' preferences regarding the substantive content of the law).
124. POSNER, supra note 1o8, at 140-41; see also Sara C. Benesh & Malia Reddick, Overruled: An
Event History Analysis of Lower Court Reaction to Supreme Court Alteration of Precedent,
64 J. POL- 534, 547 (2002) (finding that lower court judges appear to adjust their behavior




judges"' and have essentially no prospects for advancement.126 For most
Federal Circuit judges, their current jobs are the last they will ever hold. In
addition, they undoubtedly have preferences for leisure time and for good
relations with their colleagues.12 7 These factors will limit the number of
dissents that they write, and they will also limit judges' willingness to hear
cases en banc (a time-consuming and often rancorous process). But otherwise
they should not much impact the judges' substantive decisionmaking.
As described above, the Federal Circuit as an institution has a cutpoint
along any given legal dimension, with this cutpoint defined by existing law. As
the previous sections explain, existing precedent will exert a constraining force:
judges will be at least somewhat inclined in any given case to abide by the
circuit's preexisting cutpoint."' Precedent will thus limit the cases in which the
judges deviate from existing law. Particular judges, however, may have
individual cutpoints to the left or right of this median point."' Thus, if two
judges with curpoints to the right of the circuit's cutpoint - that is, two judges
with more permissive attitudes than the circuit as a whole - sit together on the
same panel, they may elect to grant a patent that would not be patentable
under governing law. Conversely, if two judges with cutpoints to the left of the
circuit sit together, they may deny a patent that should be granted under
current law.13o If Federal Circuit judges were largely homogenous - if their
125. Judicial Salaries Since 1968, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/
uscourts/JudgesJudgeships/docs/JudicialSalarieschart.pdf (last visited May 7, 2011) (listing
salaries for federal judges and members of Congress).
126. No Federal Circuit judge has ever been appointed to the Supreme Court, or to any other
significant government post. Nor has any Federal Circuit judge ever taken a substantial
corporate sector job upon retirement from the Circuit, though Howard Markey did become
dean of John Marshall Law School after leaving the court. See History of the Federal Judiciary,
FED. JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/research-categories.html
(last visited Sept. 21, 2011) (providing full biographies of all retired judges).
127. POSNER, supra note io8, at 33, 36 (describing judicial preferences for good relations with
colleagues and for leisure time). There are actually more dissents in the Federal Circuit than
on the average federal court of appeals, but dissents still occur in only 3.51% of cases.
Cotropia, supra note oo, at 816.
128. See supra Section II.C.
129. See Petherbridge, supra note 79, 445-49 (explaining this effect with respect to the Federal
Circuit).
130. This analysis assumes that Federal Circuit judges vote "honestly" -that is, they vote their
actual policy preferences, modified only by respect for precedent, desire to avoid dissenting,
and fear of reversal from the Supreme Court. This is the most realistic description of the
actual behavior of Federal Circuit judges, and it comports with how their behavior is
generally understood. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Judicial Incentives and the Appeals Process,
51 SMU L. REV. 469, 474-77 (1998); see also POSNER, supra note io8, at 207 ("The judge is
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individual cutpoints were similarly located-then any given three-judge panel
would likely resemble the circuit as a whole, and there would not be a great
deal of deviation from the full circuit's cutpoint. But because there is a great
deal of variance among Federal Circuit judges, the possibility exists that two
judges on a panel will together form a majority with a viewpoint that diverges
substantially from the circuit's cutpoint.
Finally, the judges of the Federal Circuit will simply err some proportion of
the time, voting to grant patents that they mean to deny (or reject patents they
mean to grant) because they misunderstand the technology at issue or the law.
3. The Parties' Interaction
How, then, will the parties in this institutional arrangement behave?"'
Consider first the PTO. In a typical administrative system, an agency like the
PTO would have no choice but to adhere as strictly as possible to the governing
law. If the Agency deviated from the Federal Circuit's case law, the losing party
would appeal and the PTO would risk having its decision overturned."' The
further the Agency deviated from the governing legal rule, the greater would be
its chances of reversal on appeal -and thus the more likely it would be that the
losing party would appeal in the first instance.134 The same is true for systems
of civil litigation: the further a lower-court judge deviates from appellate
wont to ask himself in such a case what outcome would be the more reasonable, the more
sensible, bearing in mind the range of admissible considerations in deciding a case, which
include but are not exhausted by statutory language, precedents, and the other conventional
materials of judicial decision making, but also include common sense, policy preferences,
and often much else besides."). Nonetheless, a later Section will abstract away from even
this assumption. See infra Section II.E.
131. For a description of the heterogeneity of Federal Circuit judges, see supra note 8o and
accompanying text. Fischman, supra note 82, at 17, demonstrates this effect empirically for
immigration cases in the Ninth Circuit.
132. The solution to this three-party game is effectively arrived at by backwards induction: the
PTO reacts to how the Federal Circuit will behave, and private parties react to how both the
PTO and the Federal Circuit will behave. This approach should be clear from the analysis.
The behavior of the relevant parties is described in this order merely for ease of exposition
and understanding.
133. Administrative Procedure Act § io(e), 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2oo6) (setting forth the rules for
judicial review of agency action).
134. Christina L. Boyd & James F. Spriggs II, An Examination of Strategic Anticipation ofAppellate
Court Preferences by Federal District Court Judges, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 37, 58-62 (2009)
(explaining the constraining force exerted by the threat of reversal by a higher court and the




precedent, the more likely she is to be overturned by an appellate court, and
thus the more probable it is that the losing party will bring an appeal.'
The essential component in such a system is formal symmetry in appellate
review. Consider, for instance, an environmental regulation promulgated by
the Environmental Protection Agency. if an industry group views the
regulation as overly restrictive, it can bring a challenge in federal court; if an
environmental group views the regulation as insufficiently protective, it too can
challenge the Agency's action.136 This is not to say that industry and
environmental challenges will always arise or succeed with equal frequency.
But parties on each side have equal opportunity to challenge the regulation,
and each must bear its own costs. " Symmetric review thus exerts a
constraining force on agency behavior: the further the Agency moves in either
direction from governing appellate law, the likelier its decision will be appealed
and reversed.
This condition does not hold for the PTO. The administrative structure of
patent law creates an asymmetry in appellate review, one that exists in few
other places within the federal bureaucracy." 8 Only PTO denials will ever be
appealed. Any applicant who receives a patent will simply depart the system,
not to be heard from again until many years later (if ever).
Of course, this asymmetry is not absolute. Improvidently granted patents
may eventually wind up in court if their owners file suit against alleged
infringers. But this process is far slower and more haphazard. The typical case
of patent litigation is decided only 8.6 years after the patent at issue was
granted."' This figure includes cases that are resolved at both the district and
appellate levels, and so it understates the age of patents that reach the Federal
Circuit.o By the time a patent reaches the federal courts on a suit for
infringement, the individuals who were involved with the patent's grant-
135. See Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Positive Political Dimensions ofRegulatory Reform, 72 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1, 98 (1994) ("The judge may also feel constrained by other factors, such as her belief
that the intent of the framers of the statute must be implemented, or her belief in
precedent."); Schauer, supra note go, at 596 (describing the pull exerted by precedent).
136. See 5 U.S.C. § 706; Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (establishing rules of
standing that govern private challenges to administrative actions).
137. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975) (describing the
"American Rule" in which each party typically bears its own costs).
138. For a partial list, see supra notes 19-23.
139. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents,
26 AIPLA QJ. 185, 234-40 (1998); see also John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO.
L.J. 435, 477 (2oo4) (providing similar data).
14o. Allison & Lernley, supra note 139, at 194.
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including the PTO Director -will likely have left office.'"' In addition, the PTO
is not a party to these lawsuits, and thus does not have to expend resources in
litigation. It also cannot be declared the "losing party" in formal terms. The
prospect of having a patent declared invalid in the course of infringement
litigation is not insignificant for the PTO. But it is far less salient than the
threat of direct appeals from the Agency's patenting decisions.
How then, is the PTO likely to behave? If the Patent Office simply
attempted to match the Federal Circuit's cutpoint -tried to follow the law, that
is -it would undoubtedly err in some cases. These errors would produce both
false negatives and false positives: the PTO would grant some patents that the
Federal Circuit would not hold valid, and it would deny some patents that the
Federal Circuit believes should be granted. False positives are not particularly
costly to the Patent Office; in those cases, the patentee is simply granted a
questionable patent, and the PTO's labors end. But false negatives give rise to
appeals and likely reversals by the Federal Circuit, at significant expense to the
PTO. 4 2
Nor would it benefit the PTO to hold a firm line against questionable
patents in an effort to reduce the total number of applications (and its
workload). The PTO has no real interest in diminishing the numbers of
applications that are filed. Like any organization, the PTO has both fixed costs
and variable costs. 143  The fixed costs are the costs of general PTO
administration, maintaining the PTO buildings, and so forth; the variable costs
are the costs of each additional application, such as the cost of hiring additional
examiners.'" Reducing the number of applications would reduce the variable
costs but not the fixed costs. The PTO obtains all of its funding from the fees
141. There have been six PTO Commissioners since 1993, none of whom has held the job for
more than five years. See List of Persons Who Have Headed the United States Patent Office,
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List of persons who have headed the United
States Patent Office (last visited Sept. 5, 2011). Generally speaking, very few government
employees remain in their jobs longer than eight years. However, precise information
regarding lower-level employees at the PTO is difficult to acquire. See Mark A. Lemley &
Bhaven Sampat, Examiner Characteristics and Patent Office Outcomes 22 (Jan. 1, 2009)
(unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1329091 ("A first problem is data: we
lack direct information about whether examiners are tenured or untenured.").
142. See supra Subsection II.D.i.
143. Cf Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality, Consumers, and Innovation, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 179, 217 ("The production of most goods and services requires the incurrence of two types
of costs: fixed costs and variable costs.").
144. Cf Einer Elhauge, Why Above-Cost Price Cuts To Drive Out Entrants Are Not Predatory-and
the Implications for Defining Costs and Market Power, 112 YALE L.J. 681, 690 n.19 (2003) ("A
fixed cost is a cost that does not vary with output levels. A variable cost is a cost that varies




accompanying patent applications, and it must pay both its fixed costs and its
variable costs with those fees.1'4 If the PTO were to reduce the number of
applications, it would have fewer application fees across which to spread its
fixed costs, and therefore fewer resources to devote to these fixed costs. This
would mean cuts to top administrators' budgets and reductions in their leisure
time, precisely what those administrators are presumably trying to avoid.*4
PTO administrators would also face reputational harms, as aggrieved
applicants appealed PTO denials of patent applications. Those reputational
harms would be exacerbated by the fact that the Federal Circuit grants minimal
(if any) deference to PTO denials of patent applications.147
Accordingly, one would expect the self-interested administrators of the
Patent Office to minimize the number of appeals and reversals. The PTO could
avoid review and reversal by approving every patent. Yet the Patent Office does
face some constraints: if it were to grant literally every patent, or even every
plausible patent, it would face harsh criticism or sanction from Congress, the
President, and the patenting community.148
The PTO is thus forced to deny some patents, but it will err on the side of
approving every application that the Federal Circuit is at all likely to grant. In
other words, the Patent Office will treat the Federal Circuit's cutpoint as more
of a floor than an optimal target. So long as the PTO is at least as lenient as the
Federal Circuit, it has little reason to fear reversal. And the more lenient the
PTO is (subject to constraints from Congress or the patenting community), the
less likely it is to be reversed. The PTO loses little by this strategy. Although
improperly granted patents can impose severe costs on other private parties (or
the economy at large),"' the individuals who govern the PTO do not
145. See Rai, supra note 30, at 2057 n.24. It is reasonable to assume that PTO fees are greater than
the PTO's variable costs, or else the agency would have already gone broke.
146. See supra notes 121-122 and accompanying text.
147. See Arti Rai, Addressing the Patent Gold Rush: The Role of Deference to PTO Patent Denials,
2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 199, 2o6 n.20, 213, 220 (2000) (listing cases in which the Federal
Circuit has overturned a PTO patent denial without even purporting to afford it deference);
Arti K. Rai, Allocating Power over Fact-Finding in the Patent System, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
907, 913 (2004) ("[O]ne key problem has been the Federal Circuit's failure to recognize that
the USPTO can, and should, be allowed to insert its knowledge of the art into the patent
examination process."). This is despite the fact that the Supreme Court has held that the
Federal Circuit should overturn PTO findings only if they are "arbitrary, capricious, ... an
abuse of discretion, or . . . unsupported by substantial evidence." Dickinson v. Zurko,
527 U.S. 150, 152 (1999) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994)).
148. The PTO may already be nearing this limit. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
149. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 5; Leslie, supra note 36.
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internalize these costs."so The result is that the PTO will set its cutpoint far
enough to the right of the Federal Circuit's to ensure that it will not errantly
deny a patent application that the Federal Circuit will later grant. In addition,
by minimizing the chance of being overturned by the Federal Circuit, the PTO
will hope to minimize the number of inventors who even bother to appeal.
Figure 6 represents this strategy graphically, with the areas of potential error
again shaded:
Figure 6.
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND PTO IN COMBINATION
.Federal Circuit PTO cutpoint Mr emsilStricter atentability curpointtMore per issible
standard patentability standard
The Federal Circuit's cutpoint is public information, though it may be
costly to discover-inventors can simply read the Federal Circuit's published
opinions. The PTO's cutpoint is also public information, though it may be
even costlier to discover."' Inventors may understand that the PTO will be
more permissive than the Federal Circuit, but they cannot know by how much.
They will also be uncertain of the PTO and Federal Circuit's rates of error.
In anticipation of a lenient PTO, inventors have strong incentives to file
even dubious patent applications.s 2 Inventors will get two bites at the apple:
the PTO might grant a patent that exceeds the Federal Circuit's cutpoint; and
even if the PTO does not grant the patent, a favorable panel of Federal Circuit
i5o. PTO administrators might be forced to internalize these costs if private parties complained
about excessive patenting to political leaders, who then took action or asserted pressure
against the Patent Office. However, as noted above, private interests are arrayed roughly
evenly in favor of and against broader patent rights. See Long, supra note 116, at 15. More to
the point, in many industries a particular firm might both own and be accused of violating
patents that would be invalid under a strict interpretation of Federal Circuit precedent.
There is thus no natural constituency positioned to oppose excessive patent grants by the
PTO.
151. The BPAI decides several thousand appeals per year. See BPAI Receipts and Dispositions by
Technology Center, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/
dcom/bpai/docs/receipts/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2011).
152. Of course, they have even stronger incentives to file for valid patents, as there is every




judges might do so. Consequently, inventors will file applications for
patentable inventions in large numbers, and will file substantial quantities of
applications on unpatentable inventions as well."'
The PTO will thus produce true positives (patents it should grant and
does), false positives (patents it should not grant but does, out of an
abundance of caution), and true negatives. This third category is made up of
patents that exceed the Federal Circuit's cutpoint, and that the PTO denies,
either as a matter of random error or because they are too outlandish even for
that Agency. However, the PTO will generate very few false negatives -patents
that the Federal Circuit would normally approve, but that the PTO denies. It is
precisely to avoid false negatives -and the likelihood of appeal and reversal -
that the PTO sets its cutpoint to the right of the Federal Circuit's. Consistent
with this prediction, the Federal Circuit has reversed the PTO in only 11.8% of
cases since 1997, and approximately 15% of cases since it was created in 1982,54
compared with a general rate of reversal across all civil cases of approximately
20%."'
4. Granted Patents and Expansionary Doctrine
Consider now the results of the institutional interaction between the PTO
and the Federal Circuit. Figure 7 (below) is a schematic representation of how
the PTO will dispose of the variety of patent applications presented to it. The
dots arrayed horizontally along the patentability spectrum represent patent
applications. The further left the dot, the more patentable it is; the further
153. Cf Gregory Mandel, The Non-Obvious Problem: How the Indeterminate Nonobviousness
Standard Produces Excessive Patent Grants, 42 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 57, 105-09 (2008) (arguing
that indeterminacy in the nonobviousness standard will cause patentees to file applications
on unpatentable inventions, leading to some obvious patents which then further muddy the
legal standard and cause the cycle to repeat).
154. See supra note 14. The PTO typically reports that its examiners are highly accurate, based on
a random sample of reviewed examiner actions. See Patent Examination Quality, U.S. PATENT
& TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/dashboards/patents/main.dashxml (last
visited Sept. 5, 2011). However, there is no way to know the standard by which the PTO is
actually judging accuracy. The suggestion here is that the cutpoint against which these
examiners are being measured is actually to the right of the Federal Circuit's cutpoint. The
PTO is successful at adhering to its own standards of patentability, which are not necessarily
the court's.
155. Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919, 1970 (2009);
see also Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal from Jury or Judge Trial:
Defendants' Advantage, 3 AM. L. & EcON. REV. 125, 130-34 (2001); Kevin M. Clermont &
Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia in the Appellate Courts: Civil Rights Really Do Difr from
Negotiable Instruments, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 947, 968-71 (2002).
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right, the more unpatentable it is. Black dots represent hypothetical PTO
patent grants; white dots represent hypothetical patent denials. As the
preceding section explained, the PTO will grant nearly all applications that fall
to the left of its cutpoint and deny nearly all applications that fall to the right of
its cutpoint.1,6 From time to time, random errors and heterogeneity among
patent examiners will cause the PTO to grant a patent to the right of its
cutpoint or deny a patent to the left of its cutpoint. (In Figure 7, the PTO has
granted one application to the right of its cutpoint and denied one application
to the left of its cutpoint.) However, because the PTO will deliberately set its
cutpoint to the right of the Federal Circuit's cutpoint, it will grant applications
that the Federal Circuit would typically deny. 157
Figure 7.
THE PTO'S TREATMENT OF PATENT APPLICATIONS
Federal Circuit PTO cutpoint




As an initial matter, it is important to note that the PTO's actions will
generate a substantial number of invalid patents, just as commentators have
observed."" Consider just the granted patents from Figure 7.
Figure 8.
GRANTED PATENTS
Stricter patentability Federal Circuit PTO cutpoint More permissive
standard p patentability standard
PTO grants
156. See supra Subsection II.D.3.
157. See supra Subsection II.D.3.




Of these granted patents, some number of them will fall to the right of the
Federal Circuit's cutpoint, simply by virtue of the fact that the PTO has set its




Federal Circuit PTO cutpointStricter patentability cutpomit More permissive
standard patentability standard
0 PTO grants
These are the false negatives the PTO will grant in an effort to avoid
reversal-the invalid patents that scholars have decried as a cost to the system
and a drag upon innovation. 9
What effect will the PTO's strategy have upon the shape of patent law? As
the preceding section explained, when the PTO grants a patent there can be no
appeal to the Federal Circuit, and thus no opportunity for the Federal Circuit
to shift the law. Only patent denials can lead to substantive legal changes.i60
Figure io displays the patent applications that have been denied by the PTO.
Figure 1o.
DENIED PATENTS
Federal Circuit PTO cutpoint
Stricter patentability curpoint More permissive
standard patentability standard
0 PTO grants
159. See sources cited supra notes 5 & 36-42 (describing the proliferation of invalid patents and
their costs).
160. Again, to be specific, there are two mechanisms by which the question of patent validity
could present itself to the Federal Circuit. True and false negatives may be appealed directly
to the court; true and false positives might find their way before the court if they are
involved in suits for infringement. This second mode is discussed further below. See infra
Subsection II.D.5.
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Importantly, the vast majority of these patent denials will fall to the right of
the Federal Circuit's cutpoint. (That is, they will be true negatives -
applications that the PTO should deny and does.) This is precisely the PTO's
intent in setting its own cutpoint to the right of the Federal Circuit's: to
minimize the number of applications it denies that the Federal Circuit might
later grant. There is thus a pronounced asymmetry in patent appeals -nearly
every case that the Federal Circuit hears on direct appeal from the PTO will
concern a boundary-pushing patent, one that it would ordinarily deny under
governing law."6
In some cases, a disappointed patent applicant will not bother to appeal to
the Federal Circuit, figuring that it is unlikely to convince the circuit to grant
the patent. And in many cases when the applicant does appeal, the Federal
Circuit will affirm the PTO and deny the patent. After all, nearly all of these
PTO denials will involve inventions that the Federal Circuit does not believe
are patentable. Recall that when the Federal Circuit affirms the PTO's refusal
to issue a patent that is unpatentable under current law, it will most likely leave
the law unchanged. Because the PTO's denial was in accordance with
governing law, the Federal Circuit can simply affirm based on that existing
precedent.162
However, every once in a while, as a matter of random chance or because of
a favorable panel draw, the Federal Circuit will grant one of these patents.163 in
Figure ii, this decision by the Federal Circuit is represented by a striped dot.
161. In Figure to, no PTO denials fall to the left of the Federal Circuit's cutpoint. Of course, this
is merely a graphical representation, and occasionally the PTO may deny a patent to the left
of the circuit's cutpoint. The point is simply that PTO denials will be heavily biased to the
right of the Federal Circuit's cutpoint. Even if a few fall to the left, they will be well
outweighed by the many denials on the other side.
162. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
163. Again, there is substantial evidence that some Federal Circuit judges are very favorably
inclined towards patents in general while others are substantially more skeptical. See supra
note 8o and accompanying text. This is also the reason that this Article has described patent
inflation as a phenomenon that particularly characterizes the relationship between the PTO
and the Federal Circuit. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA), the predecessor
court to the Federal Circuit, only sat en banc. Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Constitution of Patent
Law: The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the Shape of the Federal Circuit's
Jurisprudence, 43 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 843, 85o (2010). There was no opportunity for a favorable
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When the Federal Circuit overturns a PTO denial in this fashion, it creates
a new precedent-one that expands the boundaries of patentability. The
Federal Circuit's cutpoint will shift rightward because of the force of this new
precedent. 14 Figure 12 displays this effect:
Figure 12.
PATENT INFLATION
New Federal Circuit PTO cutpoint





The result is patent inflation: outward growth in the boundaries of what
inventions may be patented. Even if each new precedent does not stretch the
boundaries of patentability to their fullest extent (as indicated in Figure 12), it
will exert some additional force. When the next case arises, Federal Circuit
judges will be slightly more likely to rule in favor of patentability. And because
the PTO will continue to move its own cutpoint to the right in order to provide
itself with the necessary margin for error to avoid reversals, the cycle will
164. This should occur regardless of whether a given legal requirement for patentability involves
"continuous" or "lumpy" variables -that is, whether there can be small incremental changes
or only slightly larger, quantized ones. Cf Lee Ann Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 1399, 1420-21 n.88 (2005) (discussing the difference between perfectly divisible and
lumpy quantities). Even if a requirement is lumpy, movements between those nodes will be
possible so long as the "lumps" are not spaced too far apart -and Part III provides evidence
that they are not in at least one domain. I thank Lee Fennell for raising this point.
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repeat. Each time the Federal Circuit moves its cutpoint slightly, the PTO will
do the same. The Agency will continue to send primarily boundary-stretching
cases to the circuit. And the boundaries of patentability will continue to expand
outward-just as they have since the advent of the Federal Circuit. 6 ,
In theory, there could be retrenchment in the law if the PTO were to reject
an application to the left of the Federal Circuit's cutpoint. The most likely
outcome is that the Federal Circuit would reverse the PTO and grant the
patent. If, on the other hand, a Federal Circuit panel instead elected to affirm
the Agency and deny the patent, this new precedent would lead to contraction
in the legal boundaries defining patentability. Yet PTO denials that fall to the
left of the Federal Circuit's cutpoint - false negatives - will be extremely rare
and vastly outnumbered by true negatives. This is precisely why the PTO sets
its cutpoint to the right of the Federal Circuit: to avoid false negatives that
could become appeals and reversals. The predominance of true negatives over
false negatives means that the Federal Circuit will have many more
opportunities to expand the law than to contract it. The result will be an overall
bias towards inflation.
This inflation will be slow and stochastic. From time to time, individual
cases may slow the law's outward expansion or even lead to retrenchment.
Outside forces, described in more detail below, may constrain the PTO or the
Federal Circuit.' 6 6 And judges may behave differently with regard to some
doctrines than others. But over the course of years and decades, the pressure
placed on the law by asymmetric rights of appeal from the PTO should lead to
inflation in the boundaries defining what inventions may be patented. As I
explain above, this analysis assumes that any given judge's decision in a patent
case is a function of her own personal preferences (over the substantive content
of the law, her relations with her colleagues, etc.) and existing precedent. If
new inflationary precedents affect a judge's own preferences over the law -for
instance, by changing her view as to what "normal" patent law should look
like -then inflation could in theory continue unabated. Each new inflationary
precedent would alter both the existing state of the law and the judges'
personal preferences. However, it is not necessary to the argument that new
precedents affect judges' personal preferences. Even if they do not, inflation
will still occur as a result of these new precedents and their influence on judicial
decisionmaking.
However, if new precedents do not change judges' personal views, those
views will act as a brake on limitless inflation. As the law expands, it will
165. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.




eventually reach a point at which no judge is willing to go further-no judge
would favor granting a patent more outlandish than the last one granted by the
Federal Circuit. To be precise, this point will come when the law matches the
cutpoint of the second-most permissive, patent-friendly judge on the court.
Once that judge is willing to go no further, there is no second judge with
whom the most permissive judge on the court can form a majority. At this
point the law could only expand further through judicial error, not through a
favorable panel draw. Most legal analyses assume that the law of a circuit court
will be defined by its median member.'6' This analysis shows that over time,
patent law could come to be defined instead by the second-most outlying
member of the court. i68
Accordingly, the boundaries of patentability will not necessarily inflate
indefinitely. There may come a point at which the next patent is simply a
bridge too far for all (or all but one) of the judges of the Federal Circuit.
Considering that patent law has continued to expand over the past three
decades, if that point exists it is likely beyond the status quo.
5. Patent Inflation and Suits for Infringement
At the same time, the PTO will also generate true and false positives-the
many patents (valid or not) that it grants. These patents could eventually arrive
before the Federal Circuit in the course of a suit for infringement. False
positives present additional opportunities for the Federal Circuit to expand the
scope of what is patentable; true positives provide chances to contract it. At
first glance, it might appear that the latter of these effects should dominate.
There will be many more true positives than false positives, simply because
such a large percentage of patent applications submitted to the PTO will be
patentable under existing law. Accordingly, one might imagine that
infringement lawsuits will mainly afford the Federal Circuit opportunities to
167. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
168. It is worth noting that the composition of the court will change over time, and entering
members may hold more (or less) permissive views than departing ones. For instance,
members of the patent bar who were educated in the 1990s may have more expansive
visions of the law than members who were educated in the 1970s, simply because the law
had become more expansive by that point and they had been taught that such an expansive
version of the law was appropriate. If this were the case, and older judges with more
restrictive views were continually replaced by younger judges with more expansive views,
the law could continue to inflate over time because of the court's changing membership.
However, this is only speculative; it is difficult to determine whether these effects are
occurring.
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contract the scope of patentability, and that this will balance the effect of the
true negatives appealed directly to the court.
Yet this is not the case. Consider again the types of patents that the PTO
will grant, depicted in Figure 8. Not every patent involved in an infringement
suit is equally likely to have its validity adjudicated by the Federal Circuit. The
reason is that parties are more likely to settle obvious cases with certain
outcomes, leaving only close cases for the circuit to decide. 6 9 In any type of
civil litigation, settlement is driven by certainty: the more that the parties agree
on the probable outcome at trial, the more likely they are to settle.17 o The cases
that will reach trial - not to mention appeal - are those in which the outcome is
uncertain.17 ' If a patent is obviously valid or invalid-far to the left or right of
the Federal Circuit's cutpoint-the parties are very unlikely to disagree about
the likely outcome at trial. Without disagreement, there is no reason to expend
the resources necessary to have the court adjudicate it. Accordingly, the patents
that reach the appellate court in infringement suits should be clustered around
the Federal Circuit's cutpoint-sometimes slightly to the left, sometimes
slightly to the right, but always close enough to the cutpoint that the outcome
of the case is uncertain. 72
In fact, the selection effects that drive litigated cases towards the Federal
Circuit's cutpoint should be especially strong in the context of appellate cases -
those cases that hold the potential to alter the law. The reason is that the
parties have opportunities to settle the case both before and after the district
court renders a decision. Cases that reach the Federal Circuit will have run two
selection gauntlets, each of which weeds out cases at the extremes. The only
cases that remain will be close ones. 73
169. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection ofDisputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD.
1, 6-17 (1984).
170. See William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & EcoN. 61, 101-02 (1971);
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration,
2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 417-20 (1973). The reason for this phenomenon is the transaction
costs involved in litigation. If the parties can agree regarding what a judge and jury will do,
there is no reason for them to incur the transaction costs of actually undergoing a trial just
to reach that outcome. See Landes, supra, at 101-02; Posner, supra, at 417-20; see also John
Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Hedonic Adaptation and the
Settlement of Civil Lawsuits, 1o8 COLUM. L. REV. 1516, 1520-22 (2008) (explaining this point).
171. See John P. Gould, The Economics ofLegal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279, 296-97 (1973)
(seeking to show why a larger percentage of lawsuits are settled out of court than in court),
172. Cf id. at 285 (describing the types of cases that should reach trial under the author's model).
173. Interestingly, Allison and Lemley found that all courts, both district and circuit, hold
patents valid 54% of the time. Allison & Lemley, supra note 139, at 205. This is not far from




Accordingly, the patents that come before the Federal Circuit in
infringement lawsuits should be arrayed approximately symmetrically around
the Circuit's cutpoint. The reasons are twofold. First, the level of uncertainty in
cases to the right and left of the cutpoint should be relatively equal." And
second, the number of patents granted by the PTO that are just to the left and
right of the cutpoint should be approximately equivalent. This is because the
PTO will endeavor to grant every application that is near the Federal Circuit's
cutpoint, even if slightly to the right of it. 7 s Indeed, consistent with this
expectation, a 1998 study found that Federal Circuit judges uphold patents as
valid in 52% of cases.' Those patents are depicted in Figure 13 below:
may be that the appellate process is not winnowing the cases significantly. See id. at 241.
Regardless, these data indicate that cases are quite evenly divided around the Federal
Circuit's cutpoint
174. Cf Priest & Klein, supra note 169, at 4-5 (proposing that this symmetry in uncertainty will
lead to symmetric results at trial, with plaintiffs and defendants each winning approximately
5o% of cases). If anything, cases to the right of the cutpoint -those involving patents that
push the frontiers of the law -should be more uncertain.
175. See supra Subsection II.D.i. It is of course possible that relatively well-established
patentability questions will reach the Federal Circuit as companions to less certain
infringement issues within a single lawsuit. Yet these will not likely provide a source of
much movement in the law. Lawyers for the defendant will be unlikely to push the issue of
validity, and courts will most commonly opt to decide the case on the easier (infringement)
grounds. Cf Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judicial Ideology and the Transformation of
Voting Rights jurisprudence, 75 U. CHI. L. REv. 1493, 1509 (20o8) (demonstrating that judges
will decide cases on factual or procedural grounds that involve less contravention of
precedent and possibility of reversal whenever such grounds are available to them).
176. Allison & Lemley, supra note 139, at 241. A later study of the same data revealed that 54% of
the votes cast by Federal Circuit judges were to uphold the patent at suit as valid, and 46%
of those votes were to invalidate the patent. Allison & Lemley, supra note 80, at 755. Patent
law has never satisfied the strong form of the Priest-Klein hypothesis, which predicts that
plaintiffs and defendants will each win approximately 5o% of their lawsuits. Instead, patent
plaintiffs win barely a quarter of the cases they file. Mark A. Lemley, Fractioning in Patent
Law 3 (Stanford Pub. Law Working Paper No. 1895681, 2011), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1895681. This is a significant finding, but for the argument here the only
important question is how the patents that reach the Federal Circuit in infringement
lawsuits are distributed with respect to that circuit's cutpoint. The 52% figure noted in the
text suggests that those patents are approximately equivalently distributed around the
circuit's cutpoint, just as the theory presented above would predict. The fact that patent
plaintiffs have such a low win rate overall is not to the contrary.
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Figure 13.
LITIGATED PATENTS
Stricter patentability Federal Circuit PTO cutpoint More permissive
standard cutpoint patentability standard
0 PTO grants
As a result, patent law will be subject to an overall inflationary pressure.
Cases that reach the Federal Circuit via suits for infringement will provide the
circuit with approximately symmetric opportunities to expand and contract the
boundaries of patentability."' Cases that reach the Federal Circuit on direct
appeal from the PTO will predominantly provide opportunities to expand the
boundaries of patentability. A symmetric effect in one type of case coupled with
an asymmetric effect in another will lead to an overall asymmetry in the
development of the law -here, in an inflationary direction.
Importantly, the foregoing analysis gives rise to a set of testable predictions
regarding changes in the law. When the Federal Circuit has occasion to
consider a legal doctrine only (or primarily) in the context of a suit for
infringement - for instance, the doctrine of equivalents - there is no reason to
177. In fact, there might even be a slight bias toward expansion within infringement suits. When
the PTO grants a patent, it is presumed valid and will only be invalidated by a court upon a
showing of clear and convincing evidence. Microsoft Corp. v. i4 i Ltd. P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238,
2242 (2011); Spansion, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 629 F-3d 1331, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
Thus, all else being equal, the courts are more likely to affirm false positive patents than
they are to overturn false negatives. Because affirmations of false positives lead to expansion
in the law, the overall trend from these cases might be slightly inflationary.
On the other hand, it is conceivable that courts would not treat affirmances and
reversals of the PTO in symmetric fashion. Perhaps the Federal Circuit is more likely to
break new ground when it reverses the PTO than when it affirms it, simply due to the
revisionary nature of reversals. If this were true, reversals of false positives (in the course of
suits for infringement) might have a greater effect on the law than affirmances of false
negatives (on direct appeal from the PTO). This is of course possible, but it seems unlikely.
When the Federal Circuit creates law, it is creating that law with reference to existing
precedent. The extent to which the court will rely upon or argue against that existing
precedent depends upon how far its new decision deviates from that precedent, not whether
the decision is handed down as an affirmance or a reversal. After all, any court of appeals is
concerned with how its latest decisions interact with its existing jurisprudence, not how they
interact with decisions by an inferior body-much less a nonjudicial agency. Accordingly, we
should expect that the Federal Circuit will treat affirmances and reversals symmetrically,




believe that the law will move in a particular direction; infringement suits offer
symmetric opportunities for legal change. But when a legal question frequently
reaches the Federal Circuit on direct appeal from the PTO - as do issues related
to patentability -there will be a net inflationary pressure on the frontiers of the
law. When it comes to the doctrines governing patentability, the Federal
Circuit will be presented with more and better opportunities to enlarge the
boundaries than to narrow them. The result will be an overall tendency in the
direction of more permissive patenting rules. 17
While a full empirical examination is beyond the scope of this Article, there
is at least suggestive evidence to support these predictions. As noted above,
scholars have observed a Federal-Circuit-led expansion in the scope of
patentability over the past several decades.'7 9 Conversely, there is much less
evidence of patent-friendly trends in doctrines related exclusively to
infringement."s
E. A Strategic Federal Circuit
Throughout the preceding discussion, patent applicants, officials at the
PTO, and Federal Circuit judges have all behaved strategically. All three groups
of actors care about the outcomes in particular cases: inventors make strategic
decisions regarding which applications to file; the PTO makes strategic
decisions regarding which patents to grant in order to avoid review and
reversal; and Federal Circuit judges to uphold only the patents they believe
should have been granted.
Of course, the Federal Circuit could conceivably behave even more
strategically. Federal Circuit judges might recognize the theory described here
and understand that natural mechanisms of selection tend to expand the
boundaries of patentability. In response, they might take a number of steps.
They might make special efforts to create new, more constraining precedent in
the course of rejecting an invention that is unpatentable under existing law,
178. This is of course not to say that the law will always move exclusively in the direction of more
lenient standards of patentability. The effect is an overall one -on balance, the law will
expand the boundaries outward. Along the way, however, it will presumably move in fits
and starts.
179. See sources cited supra note 5-6.
i8o. See, e.g., In re Seagate Tech. L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (making it more difficult
for patent holders to collect heightened damages for willful infringement); Lee
Petherbridge, On the Decline of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 31 CARDozo L. REV. 1371, 1384
(2010) (showing that the narrowed scope of the doctrine of equivalents has led to fewer
successful infringement claims in recent years).
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contrary to typical judicial practice.1' They might also vote strategically against
self-interest in certain cases. For instance, a judge could vote against granting a
patent that she would prefer to see issued simply in order to forestall the law's
outward momentum, figuring that without such action the law would
eventually expand beyond her cutpoint.
It is possible that Federal Circuit judges are engaging in this type of
strategic behavior, but it is quite unlikely. The judges would have to be aware
of the expansion of patent law and understand that it is a natural consequence
of the asymmetry in PTO appeals, rather than simply a reflection of the median
circuit judge's preferences. (If it were the latter, this type of strategic action
would be unproductive.) This would require a focus on issues with which
circuit judges do not typically concern themselves, not to mention a surprising
level of tactical shrewdness from a circuit that has not previously displayed any
such 182such inclination. ,
In addition, patent applicants could conceivably counteract highly strategic
behavior by the Federal Circuit with strategic behavior of their own. Many
patent applicants are repeat players who file for hundreds of patents per year.113
At least some of these applicants undoubtedly have an ongoing interest in
expanding the boundaries of patentability, to the point of being willing to
sacrifice a single patent in the interest of more favorable long-term rules.18 ' If
one of these applicants appealed a PTO denial and drew a Federal Circuit panel
that seemed particularly inclined towards narrower patentability rules, the
applicant could elect voluntarily to dismiss the case.'s This would deprive the
restrictive Federal Circuit panel of a vehicle by which to retrench the law. Of
course, it is difficult to determine whether applicants have in fact adopted this
181. Cf Schauer, supra note 90, at 589 (showing that judges make decisions anticipating their
effect on future cases).
182. Cf A Conversation with Chief Judge Paul Michel, THE IP COLLOQUIUM (Jan. 5 2009),
http://www.ipcolloquium.com/Programs/4.html.
183. See Press Release, IFI CLAIMS Announces Top Global Companies Ranked By 2010 U.S.
Patents (Jan. 10, 2011), http://www.ificlaims.con/news/top-patents.html (listing the firms
that obtained the most U.S. patents in 2010).
184. Cf Galanter, supra note 15, at 97-99 (describing repeat legal players and their incentives).
185. See supra note 8o and accompanying text (describing the variability in Federal Circuit
attitudes towards patent validity). I thank Michael Gilbert and others for suggesting this
possibility. The Federal Circuit only announces which judges will be hearing any given case
on the day that case is argued. Samuel P. Jordan, Early Panel Announcement, Settlement, and
Adjudication, 2007 BYU L. REV. 55, 6o. But this should not pose any impediment to the
strategy described above. Applicants will simply wait until after the oral argument-by
which point they may have a great deal of information regarding the judges' intentions-




strategy. But at minimum it gives rise to another testable prediction: the
greater the number of patent applications a given party files each year, and the
less patent-friendly a Federal Circuit panel is, the rnore likely the applicant is to
voluntarily dismiss an appeal before that Federal Circuit panel.186
Perhaps this issue is best understood from the opposite perspective. It is
undeniable that the Federal Circuit has significantly expanded the boundaries
of what is patentable over the past two decades.' 5  Scholars have posited
various reasons for this trend, including pro-patent ideology and the possibility
that the circuit has been captured by pro-patent interests.' Although these
accounts may be correct, this Article has suggested that the expansion in
patentability can be explained without any of them. It may be wholly or in part
a natural consequence of the institutional relationship between the PTO and
Federal Circuit. If judges of the Federal Circuit are acting strategically in order
to frustrate this natural momentum, then the expansion of patentability over
the past two decades must be due to some other factor, such as ideology or
capture. This would mean that Federal Circuit judges were acting strategically
in order to frustrate an expansion of the law that they themselves favored. Such
a peculiar confluence of motives and actions seems highly unlikely.
In the end, it is impossible to know with certainty precisely how Federal
Circuit judges will behave. There may be significant heterogeneity within the
circuit as to the level of strategic behavior, just as there is significant
heterogeneity on substantive patent issues. This highlights the importance of
the testable prediction (described in Subsection II.E) regarding inflation in
some areas of law but not others. If further research validates that prediction,
then the judges of the Federal Circuit have not adopted the overly strategic
posture described here.
F. Outside Actors and Patent Remedies
Despite the Federal Circuit and PTO's predominant role in shaping patent
law, their interaction is not a closed system. 8 9 Congress, the Supreme Court,
and even other federal agencies can also exert significant influence, though they
186. This prediction is thus somewhat counterintuitive precisely because the Federal Circuit only
announces panels on the day of oral argument. See Jordan, supra note 185, at 60. By that
point, it should be nearly costless for the applicant to proceed with the case - all of the work
has been done. Accordingly, the decision to drop the appeal must rest upon an assessment of
its impact on future cases, as the applicant has nothing to lose in the present case.
187. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
iss. See sources cited supra note 34.
i8g. I thank Peter Menell for suggesting this conceptual approach.
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intervene only rarely. More importantly, these outside actors are not subject to
the pressures and selection effects described above, which are endemic only to
the relationship between the PTO and the Federal Circuit. Accordingly,
Congress, the Supreme Court, and other federal agencies can in some
circumstances act as checks on the PTO and Federal Circuit's inflationary
tendencies.
For its part, Congress has largely been absent from this field."'o For many
years after the creation of the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court was similarly
reticent and granted certiorari in very few patent cases.1 91 This might have been
due to the technical complexity of patent cases, the Court's belief that the
Federal Circuit possessed greater patent expertise, or even the Court's
satisfaction with the shape and direction of the law. Lately, however, the trend
has relaxed, and the Supreme Court has decided nine patent cases since
2005.'9' Commentators have suggested that the Court has lately become
dissatisfied with the Federal Circuit's stewardship of patent law and is acting to
rein in the circuit's expansionary tendencies.'93
This could be a welcome corrective. But it is not complete. Even an
aggressive Supreme Court cannot staunch the flow of improperly granted
patents from the PTO. The PTO will still possess an incentive to grant every
application that the Federal Circuit might conceivably allow, irrespective of
where the courts set the legal cutpoint. Without external adjustment of the
PTO's incentives, the PTO will continue to err in the direction of granting
more patents than it should. It is also difficult to rely on continued activism on
the part of the Supreme Court, given the recent nature of that trend.
19o. See Long, supra note 34, at 1968.
191. See Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV.
387, 387-89 (noting the Supreme Court's withdrawal from patent law since the creation of
the Federal Circuit).
192. See Microsoft Corp. v. i4 i Ltd. P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011); Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford
Jr. Univ. v. Roche, 131 S. Ct. 2188 (2011); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010); Quanta
Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (20o8); KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
550 U.S. 398 (2007); Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007); MedImmune,
Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S.
388 (2006); Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005); see also Golden,
supra note 34, at 658 (" [T]he Supreme Court has, in the past six years, asserted its dominion
over patent law with frequency and force.").
193. See, e.g., Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 44 (2010) (noting that
"[fjor most observers, the Court's aggressiveness reflects an attempt to rein in patent rights




Finally, the President or other executive-branch agencies might intervene
and push against the PTO's permissive tendencies.194 There is some evidence
that this has already taken place in limited fashion: the National Institutes of
Health and other organizations, fearful of an expansion in patenting, were able
to compel the PTO to adopt stricter utility guidelines for biotechnology.'95 (In
fact, this may be the only area of law in which the PTO takes a more restrictive
view than the Federal Circuit.) There are also indications that actions by the
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission may have exerted
influence on the patent system.'9' However, these intercessions have been
sporadic and confined to limited contexts. The President could also intervene
directly, either by instructing the PTO to grant fewer patents or by appointing
a PTO Director committed to enforcing a more restrictive view of the law. But
there is little evidence that the President has ever done so.19'
How, then, can the problems of bad patents and inflationary law best be
remedied? One option would be for Congress or the President to recalibrate
the PTO's incentives by providing additional funding for the Agency to litigate
appeals, removing the stigma of reversal, or committing to evaluating the
Agency based on the quality of the patents it issues without regard to which
patents are eventually litigated.198
Perhaps the most direct solution would be a workable system of inter
partes review that would allow outside parties to challenge substantial
numbers of patents before they are issued.199 However, a purely administrative
194. I thank Arti Rai for suggesting this possibility.
195. See Rai, supra note 53, at 1131-32.
196. See, e.g., Edward Lee, Introduction: The Future of Patent Reform, 4 ISJLP 1, 2 (2008) (stating
that "[a]fter the [FTC] report, both Congress and the United States Supreme Court
suddenly turned their attention to patent law reform").
197. The current PTO Director, David Kappos, has on occasion described improved patent
quality as a priority and announced various initiatives toward that end. See, e.g., David
Kappos, Taking Steps To Improve Patent Quality, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE (Oct.
19, 2010, 3:50 PM), http://www.uspto.gov/blog/director/entry/taking-steps-to-improve
patent. Of course, the PTO Director has little to lose from verbally expressing a
commitment to patent quality, and it is hard to know what to make of the PTO's
examination standards without knowing precisely how the agency evaluates whether a
patent was properly granted. Nonetheless, there is cause for at least mild optimism.
198. For instance, Congress could convene an advisory panel of patent experts to evaluate the
quality of a random sample of issued patents. Another more radical solution would be to
grant the PTO substantive rulemaking authority. See Jonathan S. Masur, Regulating Patents,
2010 SUP. CT. REV. 275, 279 (2011).
199. See, e.g., JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 5, at 184-86 (proposing a system of post-grant inter
partes review); Farrell & Merges, supra note 48, at 964-69 (same); Lichtman & Lenley,
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challenge system located entirely within the PTO would not be sufficient. Such
a system would undoubtedly provide the PTO with better information
regarding the validity of a putative patent and enable it to make a more
accurate decision, but it would not cure the Agency's fundamental incentive to
grant, rather than deny, borderline patents. Rather, the crucial ingredient is an
opportunity for challengers who lose before the PTO to appeal to the Federal
Circuit -in other words, a mechanism for symmetric review of PTO decisions.
The possibility that aggrieved parties could appeal substantial numbers of both
patent denials and patent grants would discipline the PTO. With little to gain
from an overly permissive stance, the Agency would be forced to evaluate
patent applications as much in accordance with governing law as possible. The
Agency would be more likely to make symmetric errors around its own (and
the Federal Circuit's) cutpoint, and the cases that reached the Federal Circuit
would be more equally divided between false negatives and false positives.2 oo
Accordingly, the Circuit would have approximately as many opportunities to
expand the law as to contract it, muting the inflationary effect.
Existing law allows any participant in an inter partes action to appeal to the
Federal Circuit.2 0 What is necessary, then, is to amend the inter partes
procedures such that they will come into wide use.20 2 At the same time, inter
partes review could potentially be abused by parties interested only in delaying
and harassing competitors. Any expansion of that system should be designed
to guard against such misfeasance. There are undoubtedly a variety of other
reforms that would have salutary effects on PTO and Federal Circuit behavior.
But if the patent system's malfunctions are indeed attributable in part to the
institutional relationship between the PTO and Federal Circuit, it seems
appropriate to deploy an institutional corrective in response.
supra note 5, at 63-65 (favoring such a system). The defects of the current system that
prevent parties from taking full advantage of it are described, supra note 49.
2oo. This system would not likely result in perfect symmetry because outside parties might not
appeal patent grants in the same numbers that disappointed applicants appealed patent
denials. Nonetheless, the numbers of each type of appeal would be much closer than they
are under the current administrative arrangement.
2o. America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 5329, 125 Stat. 284, 311 (2011); Patent and
Trademark Office Authorization Act of 2002, 35 U.S.C. § 315 (2006).
202. See supra note 49 (describing the very low usage rates of inter partes review and suggesting




III. THE PATENTING OF SOFTWARE AND BUSINESS METHODS
In order to demonstrate the effects of patent inflation in practice, this Part
presents a case study of the development of the rules on patentable subject
matter governing software and business method patents, culminating in the
Federal Circuit and Supreme Court decisions in Bilski v. Kappos.o3 Whether an
invention recites patentable subject matter is of course only one of the many
hurdles to patentability, but it is the subject perhaps most at the forefront of
debates over the scope of patent law, due in large part to the Bilski decisions.2 o4
The last two decades have seen a rapid expansion in the patenting of
intangible processes such as software and business methods. The story of
software and business method patents is not entirely clean and
straightforward - not surprisingly, given the number of moving parts -but it is
possible to draw some distinct conclusions. As Bilski demonstrates, both the
PTO and the Federal Circuit have played significant roles in this expansion. In
particular, the PTO has consistently operated at the vanguard of the law,
granting patents that the Federal Circuit has not yet announced it would allow.
As a result, the PTO and the Federal Circuit may have unwittingly conspired to
inflate the boundaries of patentability, just as the theory described above would
predict.
A. Software Patents, Business Methods, and State Street Bank
As recently as 1981, it was only by a five-to-four vote that the Supreme
Court held that an inventor could patent a method for curing rubber."os By the
mid-199os, however, the PTO and the Federal Circuit were presiding over a
rapid expansion of the boundaries of patentable subject matter, an expansion
that encompassed a variety of processes and methods far more intangible than
the rubber-curing method at issue in 1981.20 The groundwork for this
expansion had been laid by patents on computer software, which first emerged
203. 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010), affgln re Bilski, 545 F-3 d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
204. See, e.g., ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW & POLICY:
2009-to SUPPLEMENT 3 (2009).
205. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
zo6. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 33, at 154 (describing the "floodgates" of software patents
opening in the mid-199os); Justin M. Lee, Note, The Board Bites Back: Bilski and the
B.P.A.I., 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 49, 49 (2009) (describing the late 1990s as a "period of
considerable expansion in subject-matter eligibility").
523
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
in the late 1960s20 7 and were well accepted by the mid-199os.20s Yet in the early
and mid-199os, neither the Supreme Court nor the Federal Circuit had
sanctioned patents on business or financial methods.209
The legal uncertainty surrounding business method patents did not chill
the PTO. In the early nineties, without any explicit signal from the court, the
PTO began granting patents on a variety of business and financial methods.
These patents covered subjects ranging from a system for assessing health care
liabilities,1 o to client management software,"' to a life insurance method,"' to
a retail store checkout process,"' among many other inventions. 14 The fact that
the Federal Circuit had sanctioned software patents should not have provided
much impetus, given the number of commentators who believe that software
207. In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1378 (C.C.P.A. 1968) (adjudicating the validity of software patents for
the first time), af'd in part, rev'd in part, 415 F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
208. See, e.g., In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (allowing software patent); In re
Alappat, 33 F. 3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cit. 1994) (en banc) (same).
209. Scholars and courts have struggled to define a "business method" (as distinct from any
other type of patentable process). Nonetheless, they have managed to coalesce around a
general understanding: a business method is a means of doing business and turning a profit
that is typically unconnected from the production of any tangible good. See, e.g., Keith E.
Maskus & Eina Vivian Wong, Searching for Economic Balance in Business Method Patents,
8 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 289, 289 (2002) ("Business method patents (BMPs) award
exclusive rights to inventors for novel techniques that perform commercial functions not
embodied in specific physical inventions."); cf Allison & Hunter, supra note 45 (generally
using a definition consistent with this idea). Included in this definition are methods for
reducing the amount of taxes an individual must pay, methods for creating and selling
financial products, and methods for structuring transactions between a business and a
customer. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411 (filed Sept. 12, 1997) (method for placing an
order to purchase an item via the Internet); see also Amazon One-Click Patent Slides Through
Reexamination, PATENTLY-O (Mar. 10, 2010, 3:o6 AM), http://www.patentlyo.com/
patent/2olo/03/amazon-one-click-patent-slides-through-reexamination.html. Included also
are methods for reducing risk or creating other advantageous business conditions. See, e.g.,
U.S. Patent Application No. 08/833,892, at A- 5 (filed Apr. 10, 1997), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/go/com/sol/2007-13obilski-joint-appendix.pdf.
210. U.S. Patent No. 5,136,502 (filed Oct. 2, 1991).
211. U.S. Patent No. 5,001,630 (filed Dec. 20, 1988).
212. U.S. Patent No. 5,752,236 (filed Sept. 2, 1994).
213. U.S. Patent No. 5,256,863 (filed Nov. 5, 1991).
214. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,568,541 (filed June 21, 1994) (method for identifying and billing
phone surcharges); U.S. Patent No. 5,253,166 (filed Mar. 29. 1991) (system for sharing
airline itineraries with corporate clients); U.S. Patent No. 5,220,500 (filed Sept. 19, 1980)




should be patentable and business methods unpatentable."' On the contrary,
the PTO was simply willing to push the law forward without waiting for an
explicit signal of validity from the Federal Circuit- consistent with the theory
presented here."'
That signal finally came in 1998. In State Street Bank & Trust Co. v.
Signature Financial Group, Inc.,"2 the Federal Circuit held for the first time that
business methods constituted patentable subject matter. ,8 The court explained
that an inventor could patent "a data processing system . . . for implementing
an investment structure," though it suggested that it was important that the
process be tied to a machine of some sort. 9 Signature Financial Group's
patent claimed not only a very general "computer processor means," but also
some specific structures for storing and retrieving data and making various
types of calculations.220 However, the Federal Circuit held the invention
patentable without reaching the question of whether the patent must
necessarily involve a machine, or what requirements that machine must
meet.22' By any measure, the Signature patent qualified.
B. Bilski in the Courts
State Street Bank "opened the floodgates on business method patents."2
Over the next decade, the PTO issued patents on a wide variety of business
215. See Alan L. Durham, "Useful Arts" in the Information Age, 1999 BYU L. REV. 1419, 1515;
Michael J. Meurer, Business Method Patents and Patent Floods, 8 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 309,
334 (2002); Leo J. Raskind, The State Street Bank Decision: The Bad Business of Unlimited
Patent Protection for Methods ofDoing Business, 1o FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
61, 84-85 (1999).
216. See Jonathan M. Barnett, Property as Process: How Innovation Markets Select Innovation
Regimes, 119 YALE L.J. 384, 416 (2009) (explaining that a "change in 1996 PTO examination
guidelines" opened the door to substantial numbers of business method patents in advance
of the Federal Circuit's decision in State Street Bank).
217. 149 F.3d 1368 (1998).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1370-71.
220. Id. at 1371-72 (referencing U.S. Patent No. 5,193,056 (filed Mar. 11, 1991)).
221. Id.
222. Douglas L Price, Assessing the Patentability of Financial Services and Products, 3 J. HIGH TECH.
L. 141, 153 (2004).
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methods with little impedance (or guidance) from the Federal Circuit. A
decade later, the Federal Circuit again took up the issue in In re Bilski."
Bernard Bilski filed an application on "[a] method for managing the
consumption risk costs of a commodity sold by a commodity provider at a
fixed price."2" Bilski was effectively attempting to patent the idea of hedging
risk: a consumer of a good (for instance, a power company that used coal as
fuel) would purchase that commodity at a fixed price from a producer (the coal
company)."' The consumer would be protected against a rise in the price of the
commodity; the producer would be protected against a fall in the price."'
Bilski's application was denied by the PTO, and Bilski appealed to the Federal
Circuit.
Importantly, this patent application was an outlandish one even by the
standards of business method patents -and not just because people had been
hedging risk for centuries."' Unlike the patent in State Street Bank,"' Bilski did
not attach any sort of machine to his claims."' They were merely free-standing
money-making ideas, unmoored from any connection to the physical world.23
It is thus not surprising that Bilski's application, which pushed well beyond the
boundaries set by State Street Bank, was rejected by the PTO and appealed to
the Federal Circuit. It is precisely this type of boundary-pushing application -
and not any sort of standard invention -that theory predicts will find its way
to the courts.
Bilski's invention was undoubtedly unpatentable on any number of
grounds, not least of all because it was obvious in light of centuries of prior
223. 545 F-3 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), rev'd, Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). It is
worth noting that while State Street Bank reached the Federal Circuit in the course of
litigation, Bilski arrived on appeal from the PTO's denial of Bilski's patent.
224. U.S. Patent Application No. 08/833,892, supra note 209, at A-6.
225. Id.; see also Bilski, 545 F.3d at 949.
226. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 949 ("In essence, the claim is for a method of hedging risk in the field of
commodities trading.").
227. See, e.g., Mark D. West, Private Ordering at the World's First Futures Exchange, 98 MICH. L.
REV. 2574 (2000) (describing a seventeenth-century Japanese futures exchange used by
traders to hedge against price fluctuations).
228. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
Bilski's "invention" was also far more tenuous than the sorts of business method patents
that have been approved in cases such as AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc'ns, Inc., 172 F. 3d 1352
(Fed. Cir. 1999), which upheld a patent on a telephone service provider's system for logging
telephone calls over various networks.





practice."' But before the Federal Circuit reached that issue,"32 it held that the
invention was merely an abstract idea and thus constituted unpatentable
subject matter. 3 The court declared that a process can be patented only if:
(1) it is "tied to a particular machine or apparatus," or (2) it transforms a
particular "article[] or material[] to a 'different state or thing.'" 34 Because
Bilski's invention involved neither a machine nor the transformation of any
matter, it failed the Federal Circuit's test.3
At first glance it might appear that Bilski represented not an expansion in
the law, but a retrenchment. Indeed, the Federal Circuit rejected Bernard
Bilski's invention as unpatentable. But on its face Bilski was no narrower than
State Street Bank. The State Street Bank patent involved specialized machines"'
and would almost certainly have been allowable under any reading of Bilski.2 37
More importantly, Bilski's eventual effect on the law-and whether it
would eventually turn into an inflationary precedent -depended on one crucial
question left open by the Federal Circuit's opinion: could a general purpose
computer satisfy the "machine" prong of the test, or must the machine be
specially adapted to the claimed process in some fashion? For Bilski, the
question was irrelevant-his patent claimed no computer whatsoever."' For
the inventor in State Street Bank the question would have been irrelevant as
231. See David S. Olson, Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously: The Case for
Restricting Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REv. 181, 235 n.242 (2009) (describing
Bilski's business method as "obvious"); Dennis Crouch, Bilski: Full CAFC To Reexamine the
Scope of Subject Matter Patentability, PATENTLY-O (Feb. 15, 2008, 11:55 PM),
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2008/o2/bilski-full-caf.html ("[T]his case looks
problematic because of serious obviousness problems.").
232. Cf In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that the PTO must consider
patentable subject matter questions under Section oi before turning to other issues).
233. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), rev'd sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos,
130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010)
234. Id. at 956 (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 n.9 (1978)).
235. Id. at 964-65.
236. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1371-72 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (referencing U.S. Patent No. 5,193,056 (filed Mar. 1, 1991)). It is in this sense that
Bilski represents, at minimum, a continuation of the State Street Bank regime.
237. See supra note 228 and text following. It is worth noting that when Bilski reached the
Supreme Court, the government argued that upholding the Federal Circuit's ruling would
not call State Street Bank into question. In the government's view, there was no doubt that
the State Street Bank invention would be patentable under the Federal Circuit's machine-or
-transformation test. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 41-42, Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct.
3218 (2010) (No. o8-964), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral arguments/
argument transcripts/o8-964.pdf.
238. See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 949; U.S. Patent Application No. 08/833,892, supra note 209.
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well - the State Street Bank patent would have been allowed regardless. 9 But
for many other inventors, this question was decisive. Every software invention
requires a computer to run, and most modern business methods and tax
patents cannot be practiced without a computer of some sort as well.24o These
computers are rarely specialized to the task at hand; by and large, a standard
personal computer will suffice."' If Bilski were interpreted to require only a
general computer, most of these patents would remain valid, and it would be
easy for inventors to draft valid, enforceable claims going forward. If a more
specialized type of machine were necessary, however, Bilski might only allow a
much narrower range of patents.
C. The PTO's Response
The issue of general purpose computers was thus left to the PTO. Initially,
the PTO took the position that a process claim must include "a particular
machine" to be valid. "2 The PTO rejected a number of patents on the ground
that "[a]ny and all computing systems will suffice [under the terms of the
claim], indicating that the claim is not directed to the function of any particular
machine."" Through the middle of 2009, approximately six months after the
Federal Circuit handed down Bilski, the PTO held to the view that general
purpose computers did not qualify as "machines" under governing Federal
Circuit law."
239. See supra note 237.
240. See, e.g., Jason Pill, Note, What's So Great About SOGRAT?: An Analysis of the Ethical Issues
Created by Tax Patents and a Patently Strict Dilemma, 20 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 147, 160
(2009) ("The complex permutations and calculations claimed in many tax patents rel[y] on
quick and accurate calculations that only modern computers can perform."); Matthew
Moore, iBrief, In re Bilski and the "Machine-or- Transformation" Test: Receding Boundaries for
Patent-Eligible Subject Matter, 2010 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 005, 30 ("After all, many
business methods are inextricably intertwined with computers and software.").
241. It is worth noting again that the patent in State Street Bank would likely have been valid
under either interpretation. That patent claimed a relatively specific sort of computer with
structures oriented particularly toward the invention's purpose. State St. Bank, 149 F. 3d at
1370-72 (describing the patent claims).
242. Ex parte Langemyr, No. 20o8-1495, 2oo8 WL 5206740, at *13 (B.P.A.I. May 28, 2008),
available at http://www.uspto.gov/ip/boards/bpaVdecisions/inform/fdo81495.pdf.
243. Id. at *ii; see also Ex parte Wasynczuk, No. 2008-1496, 2oo8 WL 2262377, at *12 (B.P.A.I.
June 8, 2008), available at http://www.uspto.gov/ip/boards/bpai/decisions/inform/
fdo81496.pdf; MERGES & DuFFY, supra note 204, at 43.
244. See sources cited supra note 243; see also Ex parte Cornea-Hasegan, No. 2008-4742, 2009 WL
86725 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 13, 2009), available at http://des.uspto.gov/Foia/ReterivePdf?system




However, in July of 2009, the PTO shifted its stance.24 In Ex parte
Dickerson, it granted a patent on a "computerized method" of optimizing
business performance. 6 The Agency argued that the invention "include [s] a
step of outputting information from a computer . .. and therefore, [is] tied to a
particular machine or apparatus." 7 The machine in Dickerson was not at all
particular: the claims called only for a general-purpose computer.24 (The
PTO's reversal did not go unnoticed; even the chiefjudge of the Federal Circuit
observed that the PTO had taken "inconsistent approaches" to the issue of
general purpose computers since Bilski. 49) The PTO has hewn to this
permissive view of general-purpose computers ever since Dickerson.
The PTO's behavior in the wake of Bilski was predictable and consistent
with the model developed above -just like its behavior before State Street Bank.
The initial rulings in which the PTO demanded "particular" machines, rather
than merely general computers, may well have been the PTO's best guess as to
how the Federal Circuit would decide the issue. Yet the Agency was not
content to continue with that approach. The PTO had nothing to gain and
quite a bit to lose if it attempted to hold the line against inventions that the
Federal Circuit might eventually accept. Faced with uncertain law, it elected to
err on the side of granting patents, rather than denying them.2"o The PTO
found itself pushing the legal frontier without a clear signal from the Federal
Circuit.
The result of the PTO's actions will be a proliferation of software, tax, and
business method patents involving only a general purpose computer. In most
cases this is a trivial additional limitation to an invention, and one that should
not greatly inhibit inventors from obtaining and enforcing valuable patents.
245. The PTO's shift might have been due in part to the fact that the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Bilski the previous month. See Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009) (mem.). At
the time, it seemed highly unlikely that the Supreme Court would hold that Bilski's
invention involved patentable subject matter, and indeed the Court affirmed the Federal
Circuit on that point. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3226-28 (2010). But the mere fact of
the grant of certiorari might have introduced enough uncertainty to persuade the PTO to err
on the side of caution.
246. No. 2009-001172, 2009 WL 2007184, at *1 (B.P.A.I. July 9, 2009), available at
http://des.uspto.gov/Foia/ReterivePdf?system=BPAI&flNm=fd2009001172-07-09-2009-1.
247. Id. at *8; see also MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 204, at 44.
248. Dickerson, 2009 WL 2007184, at *4-
249. Tony Dutra, Chief Judge Michel Says Commentary Reading Too Much into Bilski Opinion,
78 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 373 (2009); see also MERGES & DUFFY, supra note
204, at 44.
25o. See Dickerson, 2009 WL 2007184, at *6.
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Had the Federal Circuit's Bilski decision remained in force, and had the
PTO continued to grant patents on processes attached to general computers,
the cases finding their way to the Federal Circuit would likely have involved
inventions that challenged the frontiers of patentability even more directly. The
Federal Circuit would have seen few patents involving general computers, most
of which the PTO would simply have granted. Rather, PTO denials might have
involved even more general sorts of machines, or business methods that did
not require machines but claimed to transform matter in some fashion. Over
time, one might have expected to see the boundaries of patentability advance
once again.
Of course, the Federal Circuit's Bilski decision did not stand long. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari' and announced that the Federal Circuit
could not treat the machine-or-transformation test as entirely determinative of
whether an invention involved patentable subject matter.' While that test
might be "a useful and important clue,"2 s' the true test for patentable subject
matter is whether an invention is merely an "abstract idea" or something
more.'" The Court's intervention was not surprising, given the theory
presented here. The Supreme Court is not subject to the same inflationary
pressures as the Federal Circuit, and it was likely reacting to the expansion in
the law produced by the Federal Circuit and PTO.
The patentable subject matter rules have thus returned to a state of
substantial uncertainty," and it will remain for the Federal Circuit to sort out
the law's particularities in the years to come."' As the PTO reacts to new rules,
it will likely send the Federal Circuit an ever-advancing wave of boundary-
pushing patent denials, primed for conversion into new, inflationary law.
251. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009).
252. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3226-28 (2010).
2S3. Id. at 3227.
254. Id. at 3225 (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)) (enumerating types
of unpatentable subject matter).
2S5. This is not even to speak of the jurisprudence on patenting isolated molecules and other
products derived from nature. That is an entirely separate strand of law, and one beyond the
scope of the short case study presented here. See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. PTO,
653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (upholding a patent on a purified DNA sequence).
256. That process has already begun, in halting, conflicted fashion. Compare Ultramercial, LLC v.
Hulu, LLC, 657 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that a particular method of internet
advertising involving only general purpose computers, software, and the internet constitutes
patentable subject matter), with Cybersource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that a particular method for verifying internet credit card
transactions involving software, the internet, and a "computer readable medium" did not





In recent years the Patent and Trademark Office and the Federal Circuit
have been widely criticized for their poor stewardship of the patent system.
The PTO grants significant numbers of invalid patents, while the Federal
Circuit has radically expanded the boundaries of what can be patented. These
problems have been attributed to a variety of causes, including
mismanagement and underfunding at the PTO, a lack of expertise, interest-
group capture, and an ideological preference in favor of extensive patenting.
Each of these factors may be responsible to some degree. But the problems that
plague patent law can be explained without reference to any of these factors,
and the problems could well persist even if all of these other potential causes
are addressed. The PTO's interest in avoiding appeals and reversals, coupled
with the Federal Circuit's asymmetric review of PTO decisions, are themselves
enough to generate a surplus of invalid patents and an inflationary patent law.
The patent system's dysfunction could be in part a consequence of the
relationship between the PTO and Federal Circuit. Accordingly, policymakers
should seek institutional remedies to what is fundamentally an institutional
problem.
Finally, there is no reason to believe that these inflationary effects are
necessarily confined to patents.s 7 Asymmetric rights of appeal -or asymmetric
rates of appeal-could be driving inflation across a range of other
administrative fields,"' or even in civil litigation more generally. 9 These
effects may be much more muted, or they may be dwarfed by broader technical
or ideological shifts in the law. For instance, if administrative decisionmakers -
immigration judges, for instance-are driven more by ideological concerns
than by the desire to avoid appeals and reversals, they will not necessarily send
257. See supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text.
258. For instance, there is evidence that the administrative law judges charged with adjudicating
Social Security disability claims have become more and more permissive over time. See
generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Should We Do About Administrative Law Judge Disability
Decisionmaking? 5 (unpublished manuscript 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1890770 ("Both
the average [Administrative Law Judge] grant rate and the distribution of [Administrative
Law Judge] grant rates have increased dramatically over the last three decades."). This
development could be attributable, at least in part, to the asymmetric nature of appeals from
Administrative Law Judges' Social Security decisions. See supra note 19. I take no position
on whether this is a beneficial or harmful development.
259. See Eduardo M. Pefialver & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Judicial Takings or Due Process?,
97 CORNELL L. REv. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1791849
(describing such a mechanism in property law).
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predominantly boundary-pushing cases to the courts of appeal.21o This could
eliminate or reverse any inflationary pressure. Inflation is highly contextual,
and further work is necessary to determine its effects in other legal domains.
But the possibility exists that asymmetries in appeal exert pressure on legal
boundaries even in disciplines far removed from patent law.
260. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DuKE L.J. 1635, 1665-75
(2010) (describing the increasing politicization of Immigration Judges within the Executive
Office for Immigration Review).
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